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ESSAYS ON THE IMPACTS of QUANTITATIVE EASING ON FINANCIAL MARKETS 
By Joanne Guo 
Advisor: Professor Tao Wang 
Due to the severity of the financial crisis of 2008, the Federal Reserve had attempted a 
variety of unconventional monetary policy to support the U.S. financial markets at the verge of 
collapse.  The most well-known of the Fed’s unconventional monetary policy is quantitative 
easing, in which it purchased a large amount of government securities from the markets in order 
to lower longer term interest rates and mortgage rates.  The several rounds of quantitative easing 
had different impacts, intended as well as unintended, on U.S. financial markets and foreign 
markets.  The purpose of this paper is to fully explore the effects, especially the unintended ones, 
the different rounds of quantitative easing have on financial markets. 
The first chapter is a comprehensive study of the unconventional monetary policy taken 
by the Federal Reserve since the financial crisis, specifically on the purchases of different assets 
by the Fed to change medium and long-term rates.  Included in this chapter are the three rounds 
of quantitative easing, and the two rounds of Operation Twist.  A study as such is needed in 
order to examine if the Fed’s purchases of these various long-term assets had any effect on the 
financial markets in the longer term perspective since the first announcement of such purchase in 
November 2008.  While there exists a variety of literature on the effects of quantitative easing on 
Treasuries and mortgage backed securities, there is no single study comprising of all the large 
scale asset purchases by the Fed, covering their effects on all major financial assets.  This first 
chapter is an attempt to fill this void in current literature on quantitative easing. 
The second chapter utilizes an event-study approach to analyze the impact of 
announcements regarding the third round of quantitative easing on emerging market economies.  
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Using a daily panel data of fifteen emerging economies, the period examined is from August 1, 
2012 to May 30, 2014, which is one month before QE3 announcement one month after the fourth 
announcement of tapering by the Fed.  Results show that markets have a larger response to 
tapering news than easing news, particularly from official Fed press releases.  Additionally, these 
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Chapter 1 Quantitative Easing and U.S. Financial Asset Returns 
1.1 Introduction 
1.1.1  Unconventional Monetary Policy Since 2008 
The Federal Reserve has been very visibly pursuing unconventional monetary policy 
since the 2008 financial crisis, particularly the large-scale asset purchases (LSAPs) of long-term 
securities including Treasuries, Agency bonds and mortgage-backed securities (MBS).  The 
purchases of these securities are called quantitative easing (QE), for the purpose of reducing 
medium and long-term interest rates to stimulate economic activity.  Quantitative easing has 
been considered unconventional since the conventional monetary policy taken by the Fed before 
the financial crisis was to target the short-term fed funds rate.  However, the Fed exhausted its 
conventional monetary influence during the time of crisis when the fed funds rate reached its 
lower bound of zero, and unusually aggressive monetary stance was needed in order to prevent 
financial conditions from worsening. 
The Federal Reserve initiated several measures to alleviate the deteriorating financial 
condition, stabilize the financial system, and reduce the damaging impacts of the recession.  
They included large-scale purchasing of financial assets, providing short-term secured loans to 
financial institutions, facilitating loans to institutions with commercial papers, lowering the 
discount rate to zero, and paying interest to banks for their required reserves.  Yet another 
strategy is to manage market expectations of impending Fed actions via communications to the 
public about its policy stances and economic goals. 
The large-scale asset purchases, or quantitative easing, have been the focus of scrutiny of 
Fed policies since the 2008 financial crisis to the present time, because while the financial crisis 
had passed, the subsequent effects of the recession and the weak employment market have 
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lingered, and the Fed is still engaging in quantitative easing in order to prevent possible 
economic downturn.  Subsequent to the announcement of the first round of quantitative easing 
on November 28, 2008, there have been three more rounds of large-scale asset purchases in 
August 2010, September 2012, and December 2012.   
 
1.1.2  The Three Rounds of Quantitative Easing 
The first quantitative easing was announced on November 25, 2008, that the Fed would 
purchase $500 billion in mortgage-backed securities and up to $100 billion in agency debt of 
Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, Ginnie Mae, and Federal Home Loan Banks.  Furthermore, in March 
2009, the Fed expanded the mortgage buying program with additional purchase of $750 billion 
more in mortgage-backed securities.  Overall, when this first round of LSAP ended on March 31, 
2010, it purchased a total of $1.25 trillion in mortgage-back securities and $175 billion in agency 
debt.  The main purpose of this action was “to reduce the cost and increase the availability of 
credit for the purchase of houses, which in turn should support housing markets and foster 
improved conditions in financial markets more generally.”1 
The second quantitative easing was announced on August 10, 2010 Federal Open Market 
Committee “will keep constant the Federal Reserve’s holdings of securities at their current level 
by reinvesting principal payments from agency debt and agency mortgage-backed securities in 
longer-term Treasury securities.”  Additionally, the Fed started purchasing $600 billion of 
longer-term securities.  It was intended to promote a stronger pace of economic recovery. 
The third quantitative easing was announced on September 13, 2012 that the Fed was 
committing to an open-ended purchase of $40 billion in agency MBS per month until the labor 
                                                          
1 Federal Reserve Press Release on November 25, 2008 at 8:15 a.m. EST. 
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market improves substantially.  On December 12, 2012, the Fed decided to continue and magnify 
the attempt of the third round of quantitative easing by increasing the amount of open-ended 
purchase from $40 billion to $85 billion per month.  This third round of purchase is still an 
ongoing process as of the writing of this paper. 
To further strengthen the economy and to prevent the recovery from losing its 
momentum, the Fed also tried to influence the yield curve by selling short-term Treasuries and 
using the proceeds to purchase longer-term Treasuries in what is conventionally called Operation 
Twist (OT).  The FOMC announced the first round of Operation Twist on September 21, 2011 
with the intention of purchasing $400 billion of bonds with maturities of 6 to 30 years and to sell 
bonds with maturities of less than 3 years, thereby extending the average maturity of the Fed’s 
own portfolio.  The second round of Operation Twist was announced on June 20, 2012, 
extending the first program with additional $267 billion in purchase, and prolonging the program 
through December 2012.  Figures 1.1 Panels A – C on the following three pages illustrate and 
summarize representations of major financial markets – the stock market, Treasuries market, and 
the foreign exchange market – a month before and after notable LSAP announcements by the 
Fed.  As depicted in the figures, major financial markets reacted significantly to significant Fed 






 Figure 1.1 Panel A.  Responses of SPY Prices on QE Announcements
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Figure 1.1 Panel B.  Responses of 10-Year Treasury Yields on QE Announcements  
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Figure 1.1 Panel C.  Responses of $/EURO on QE Announcements   
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1.1.3  Outline of the Chapter 
This paper is a comprehensive study of the unconventional monetary policy taken by the 
Fed since the financial crisis, specifically on the purchases of different assets by the Fed to 
change medium and long-term rates.  Included in this study are the four quantitative easing, and 
the two rounds of Operation Twist.  A study as such is needed in order to examine whether the 
Fed’s purchases of these various long-term assets had any effect on the financial markets in the 
longer term perspective since the first announcement of such LSAP in November 2008.  While 
there exists a variety of literature on the effects of quantitative easing on Treasuries and 
mortgage backed securities, there is no single study comprising of all the LSAPs by the Fed, 
covering the effects of all of these LSAPs on all major financial assets.  Figure 1 illustrate price 
and yield movements of the equity, fixed-income, and currency markets before and after for 
some notable QE announcement dates. 
A complete and thorough study on the effects of these LSAPs on all sectors of the 
financial market is necessary since these monetary easings by the Fed not only affect the yields 
for Treasuries and mortgage-backed securities, but also prices and yields of other types of 
financial assets.  Bernanke and Reinhart (2004) maintain that the pricing of financial assets such 
as equities and mortgages depends partly on the entire expected future path of short-term interest 
rates, as well as the current short-term interest rate.  A central bank can then affect asset prices 
and economic activity by guiding market expectations of future short-term rates.  Recent 
literature, i.e. Svensson (2001), Eggertsson and Woodford (2003), suggests that additional 
monetary stimulus such as quantitative easing can be introduced together with some form of 
commitment to the public to keep short-term interest rate low for a prolonged period of time, 
even after when the economy shows some sign of recovering.  This commitment should lower 
8 
 
yields via the term structure component of bonds and support other asset prices, provided that the 
commitment is a credible one.  
Since each of these LSAPs are different, and occurred under different economic 
circumstances, they should have different impacts on the economy.  Krishnamurthy and Vissing-
Jorgensen (2011) conclude that effects of QE on particular assets depend on which assets are 
being purchased by the Fed, and find that it is inappropriate to focus solely on a policy target, 
such as Treasury rates, since QEs have different effects on different assets via several channels, 
such as a prepayment channel for MBS.  
Gagnon et al (2010) present evidence that the purchases led to economically meaningful 
and long lasting declines on treasuries, agency bonds, mortgage backed securities, Treasury 
inflation protected securities (TIPS), SWAPS, and corporate bonds.  However, many such 
studies only include the fixed-income sector.  By lowering Treasury and MBS yields, the effects 
of these LSAPs also potentially spilled over to the broad financial market since stocks and other 
financial assets are influenced by the Fed’s current actions and expectations on its future 
monetary policy stance. 
By conducting an event-study on the major LSAP announcement dates since November 
2008 to August 2014 (the date of this writing) on all the major financial assets, this paper 
identifies the effects of the Fed’s purchases throughout the economy, and compares the 
effectiveness of all these large scale asset purchases since the 2008 financial crisis.  This paper 
fills the void of current literature and provides a complete picture of the Fed’s asset purchases 
since the 2008 financial crisis.   
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The paper is structured as follows.  Section 2 is a survey of current literature on the 
impact of quantitative easing on different financial assets.  Section 3 describes the data, model, 




1.2 Literature Review 
1.2.1 The Portfolio Balance Channel and Signaling Channel of Quantitative Easing 
A vast literature exists on using the event-study approach to observe the effects of the 
recent large scale asset purchases on different financial assets, as central banks of Japan, 
England, Europe, and the United States initiate and continue purchases of financial assets to 
support the economy since the 2008 financial crisis.  Even before the financial crisis, the Fed has 
been studying alternative monetary policy given the zero-bound constraint of the Fed Funds rate.  
Using the standard method to decompose yields on safe long-term government bonds, the 
predominant observation is that there are two channels that a central bank’s purchasing program 
can work through to impact broader market bond yields and other types of interest rates: the 
portfolio balance channel and the signaling channel.  The portfolio balance channel emerges 
from a central bank’s large purchases of long-term bonds, thereby decreasing the supply in 
private-sector portfolios and reducing the term premium.  The signaling channel occurs via the 
central bank’s announcements of such large-scale asset purchases, where it influences market 
participants to expectation that future short-term interest rates will be kept very low for a 
prolonged period of time, even as the economy show signs of recovery. 
The existing literature considers the portfolio balance channel to be the key channel of 
how a central bank’s large-scale asset purchase works through to impact interest rates.  In his 
speech on August 27, 2010, the Fed Chairman Ben Bernanke described this channel as follows: 
“The channels through which the Fed's purchases affect longer-term 
interest rates and financial conditions more generally have been subject to 
debate. I see the evidence as most favorable to the view that such purchases 
work primarily through the so-called portfolio balance channel, which holds 
that once short-term interest rates have reached zero, the Federal Reserve's 
purchases of longer-term securities affect financial conditions by changing the 
quantity and mix of financial assets held by the public. Specifically, the Fed's 
strategy relies on the presumption that different financial assets are not perfect 
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substitutes in investors' portfolios, so that changes in the net supply of an asset 
available to investors affect its yield and those of broadly similar assets. Thus, 
our purchases of Treasury, agency debt, and agency MBS likely both reduced 
the yields on those securities and also pushed investors into holding other 
assets with similar characteristics, such as credit risk and duration. For 
example, some investors who sold MBS to the Fed may have replaced them in 
their portfolios with longer-term, high-quality corporate bonds, depressing the 
yields on those assets as well.  
The logic of the portfolio balance channel implies that the degree of 
accommodation delivered by the Federal Reserve's securities purchase 
program is determined primarily by the quantity and mix of securities the 
central bank holds or is anticipated to hold at a point in time (the "stock view"), 
rather than by the current pace of new purchases (the "flow view"). In support 
of the stock view, the cessation of the Federal Reserve's purchases of agency 
securities at the end of the first quarter of this year seems to have had only 
negligible effects on longer-term rates and spreads.” 2 
 
Daniel L. Thornton, Vice President and Economic Advisor at the Federal Reserve Bank 
of St. Louis, presents several reasons to be skeptical of the theoretical foundations of the 
portfolio balance channel, and presents empirical results that show little evidence of a 
statistically significant portfolio balance channel and no evidence of an economically meaningful 
effect (Thornton, 2012).  However, his work focuses more on the longer-term effects of QE, and 
uses less frequent monthly data. 
 
1.2.2  Literature on the Fed’s Asset Purchases Before and After the 2008 Financial Crisis 
Clouse et al (2000) explore scenarios where the nominal Treasury-bill rate is assumed to 
be zero.  They consider the effectiveness of further open market purchases of Treasuries to 
stimulate the economy via managing expectations of the future paths of short-term interest rates, 
inflation, and asset prices.  They also examine alternative monetary policies available for the Fed 





to deploy in theory when the nominal short-term interest rate is zero.  These possible policy tools 
include open market purchases of Treasury bonds, discount window lending, and use of options. 
In the case of the Fed conducting open market purchase of Treasury bills when this 
asset’s yield reaches zero, the private-sector considers Treasury bills and the monetary base as 
perfect substitutes.  As such, open market purchases of Treasury bills do not change Treasury-
bill rates since the initial portfolio is not in disequilibrium.  Additionally, such purchases have no 
direct effect on the public wealth as there are no longer any potential capital gains since the 
Treasury bill rate cannot be reduced any further.  However, this supposition does not consider 
the case of the Treasury bill rate being negative, as it did when the 3-month T-bill dipped below 
zero on December 9, 2008, and the one-month T-bill has yielded as low as -0.03% on August 4, 
2011. 
In the case of the Fed purchasing assets other than Treasuries, even if these assets are 
perfect substitutes for Treasuries, quantitative easing could have an impact on the economy 
through a “signaling effect.”  This effect leads market participants to lower their expectations for 
future short-term interest rates, and possibly lengthening the expected duration of very low or 
zero target Fed Funds rate.  Clouse et al conclude that aside from the signaling effect, the impact 
of asset purchases by the Fed depends on whether the assets purchased are imperfect substitutes 
for the monetary base and Treasuries.  If the assets purchased are imperfect substitutes, then 
purchasing these assets can have an impact through their supply in the market.  Furthermore, 
very large open market purchases of domestic and foreign government bonds might well lower 
domestic bond yield and cause the home currency to depreciate, but the likely size of these 
effects is unknown.   
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Bernanke, Reinhart, and Sack (2004) apply the tools of modern empirical finance to the 
present experiences of the United States and Japan.  They examine possible effectiveness of 
different nonstandard monetary tools when the conventional monetary tool of targeting Fed 
Funds rate is near the zero bound.  Policy alternatives, other than the fed funds rate, are grouped 
into three classes: (1) using communications policies to shape public expectations about the 
future direction of interest rates; (2) quantitative easing, or increasing the size of the central 
bank’s balance sheet: and (3) changing the composition of the central bank’s balance sheet, e.g. 
selling its holding of shorter-term bonds in exchange for longer-term bonds in order to lower 
longer-term interest rates3.  Bernanke, Reinhart, and Sack employ two approaches in order to 
garner new evidence concerning the effectiveness of unconventional monetary policy tools.  
First, by utilizing an event-study approach, they measure and analyze the behavior of selected 
asset prices and yields over a short period of time surrounding central bank new releases and 
statement, or other types of financial or economic news.  The event studies confirm that FOMC 
statements do have important impacts on private sector policy expectations, both directly and 
indirectly.  This finding leads to the suggestion that the FOMC does have some capacity to 
influence yields and prices of longer-term assets by using communications policies. 
Second, Bernanke, Reinhart, and Sack estimate “no-arbitrage” models of the term 
structure for the United States and Japan so as to allow for the prediction of interest rates at all 
maturities.  The predicted term structure then is used as a benchmark to assess whether factors 
not included in the model have any effects on interest rates, such as a large scale asset purchase 
by a central bank.  Moreover, they find some evidence that suggests the relative supplies of 
securities matter for yields for U.S. bonds, and that this is a necessary condition for achieving the 
                                                          
3 This is often referred to as Operation Twist, since the central bank is attempting to “twist” the shape of the yield 
curve with the combined actions of selling shorter-term bonds and purchasing longer-term bonds. 
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desired effects from targeted asset purchases.  They conclude that unconventional monetary 
policies do appear to affect asset prices and yields, and consequently, aggregate demand. 
Swanson (2011) undertakes a modern event-study analysis of the 1961 Operation Twist 
and uses its estimated effects to assess what should be expected for QE2.  The paper presents 
evidence that the 1961 Operation Twist and the second round of quantitative easing in 2010 are 
similar in magnitude.  The author concludes that with high statistical significance, the cumulative 
effect of the six major announcements of Operation Twist amounts to about 15 basis points.  The 
effects of Operations Twist on long-term agency and corporate bond yields are smaller but also 
statistically significant.  The evidence indicates that Operation Twist has a larger impact on 
Treasury securities, and its effect is weaker on private sector credit instruments. 
Gagnon et al (2010) explains how the Fed implemented the first quantitative easing in 
2008, and discusses the channels through which they can affect the economy.  The paper 
concludes that the Fed’s purchases were effective in lowering longer-term private borrowing 
rates and in stimulating the ailing economy.  The evidence suggests that the impacts of the Fed’s 
actions are widespread throughout the different securities studied in the paper, including 
Treasuries, corporate bonds, and interest-rate swaps.  The impact is the most pronounced in the 
mortgage market, thus achieving the Fed’s primary intention of supporting economic activity, 
especially the housing market at that time. 
Gagnon et al find that the primary channel through which QE1 appears to work is the risk 
premium on the asset being purchased, by bidding up the price of the asset being purchased and 
thus lowering its yield.  This process, which applies to only longer-term yields, is commonly 
known as the portfolio balance effect.  The portfolio balance effect can be decomposed into two 
components: the average level of short-term risk-free interest rates expected over the term to 
15 
 
maturity of the asset, and the risk premium.  The authors acknowledge that in theory, the effects 
of QE1 could result from changing either of these two components.  However, they believe that 
the Fed has not been using quantitative easing as a signal that the future path of short-term risk-
free interest rates would remain low.  They find that neither the language about future policy 
rates in the FOMC statements nor the LSAP announcements appear to have had a substantial 
effect on the expected future federal funds rate.  Therefore, they conclude that any decrease in 
longer-term yields as a result of the Fed’s LSAP has likely come through in the form of 
narrowing risk premiums.  Additionally, they find that since the most important part of the risk 
premium for Treasury securities is referred to as the “term premium,” the LSAPs have also 
lowered the duration risk in the financial market in general.  Thus, the LSAPs have caused the 
decrease of duration risk and the term premium across all asset classes. 
Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen (2011) evaluate the effects of QE1 and QE2 on 
interest rates using an event-study methodology.  They feel that it is inappropriate to focus only 
on Treasury rates as a policy target since QE works through several channels to affect specific 
asset differently, since there are several channels of how the Fed’s purchases work through the 
economy to impact different assets in different ways.  One of their main findings is that the large 
reductions in mortgage rates after QE1 can be attributed to the large purchases of agency MBS, 
thereby reducing the price of mortgage-specific risk.  However, for QE2, which involved only 
Treasury purchases, the impact on treasury and Agency bond rates are substantial, but not so 
much on MBS and corporate bond rates.  Moreover, they find a significant reduction in the 
default risk/default risk premium for corporate bonds only for QE1, but not QE2, which suggests 
that the MBS purchases initiated during QE1 may also have facilitated the lowering of corporate 
credit risk and thus corporate bond yield. 
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The paper details and examines the seven channels through which quantitative easing 
may be expected to affect different financial assets, and mentions the Eggertson and Woodford 
(2003) finding that via a signaling channel, non-traditional monetary policy can have an effect in 
lowering long-term bond yields.  But this signaling channel can work only if the policy is a 
credible commitment by the central bank in keeping the interest rate low for an extended period 
of time, even after the economy recovers.  Clouse et al (2000) recommend the central bank to 
purchase a large quantity of long-term assets to show commitment.  With the expectations 
hypothesis, this signaling channel affects all interest rates. 
Another noteworthy channel that QE works through is duration risk, which comes from 
the term premium of bonds.  It reflects the reluctance of investors to bear interest risk with 
longer-term bonds, thus longer duration bonds carry a term premium—the additional return that 
investors require from a bond with fixed long-term yield, beyond the average of expected future 
short-term interest rates. 
By purchasing long-term securities, monetary policy can decrease duration risk and 
reduce longer-term bond yields relative to shorter-term bond yields.  Furthermore, there is a 
liquidity channel, where QE increases liquidity for long-term securities and decreases the 
premium yield investors pay for shorter-term, more liquid bonds. 
In order to examine how QE affects different interest rates via these different channels, 
Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen use the difference-in-difference approach supplemented 
with information from derivatives as their main empirical methodology.  Financial assets in their 
study include long-term Agency bond yields, long-term treasury bond yields,  MBS yields, 
corporate bond yields, TIPS, federal funds futures contracts, the CDS swap rates, the inflation 
swap rates, and the implied volatility on interest rate options.   Their main conclusions are that 
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the Federal Reserve’s purchase of long-term bonds during QE1 and QE2 significantly lowered 
nominal interest rates on Treasuries, Agencies, corporate bonds, and MBS, but these effects are 
not of the same magnitudes across different types of bonds, maturities, and Fed purchase 
programs.  One of the primary channels that both QEs work through is a signaling channel which 
drives down the yield on all bonds, with stronger effects on intermediate bonds rather than longer 
termed bonds.  Further, the authors decompose the portfolio balance effect/channel so as to 
pinpoint the specifics of how QE works through this channel to affect interest rates.  The authors 
quote Brian Sack, the head of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York’s Open Market desk, when 
discussing how the portfolio balance channel can work in a large-scale asset purchase by the 
Fed4: 
“The purchases bid up the price of the asset and hence lower its 
yields.  These effects would be expected to spill over into other assets that 
are similar in nature, to the extent that investors are willing to substitute 
between the assets.  These patterns describe what researchers often refer to 
as the portfolio balance channel.” 
 
Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen conclude that one portfolio balance channel that is 
prominent in both QE1 and QE2 is the safety channel affecting safe long and medium-term 
bonds with low default risks.  This safety channel highlights the substitutability of assets within a 
class with low-default risks. 
Another element in the portfolio-balance channel is the duration-risk channel.  Brian 
Sack spoke of this particular channel in a later speech5: 
“The effects of the asset purchase programs are thought to arise 
from the amount of duration risk that they remove from the portfolios of 
private investors.  By removing duration risk, the Federal Reserve puts 
downward pressure on the longer-term real interest rates, which in turn 





pulls down private borrowing costs and makes broader financial conditions 
more supportive of growth. 
“Duration risk can be measured in a variety of ways, but one 
common measure for a securities portfolio is ten-year equivalents, or the 
amount of 10-year Treasury notes that an investor would have to buy to be 
exposed to the same amount of duration risk contained in the portfolio.  
Some of the staff work that calibrates the economic impact of the Federal 
Reserve’s balance sheet policies assumes that the effects on yields and 
financial conditions are driven by the amount of ten-year equivalents that 
the Fed takes into its portfolio.” 
 
While the Fed believes that duration risk channel is the main proponent of how QE 
works, Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen do not find support for the presence of duration-
risk channel in either QE1 or QE2. 
Stroebel and Taylor (2012) examine the quantitative impact of the Fed’s purchase of 
mortgage-backed securities during the financial crisis on mortgage interest rate spreads.  They 
use a multivariate statistical framework and take into account other possible influences on 
spreads, while controlling for two other possible influences on mortgage spread, namely changes 
in prepayment and default risk.  Their empirical results assign a considerable portion of the 
decline in mortgage rates to prepayment and default risks, and a relatively small and uncertain 
portion to the Fed’s asset purchasing program.  For instances where the existence or 
announcement of the quantitative easing seems likely to have decreased spreads, their results 
show no separate effect of the Fed’s purchases.  Additionally, they show that the estimated size 
of the impact of the Fed’s MBS purchase on mortgage spreads can be traced to a shift in the 
spread between Treasuries and swaps at the time of the panic in October 2008.  However, this 
paper does not address the issue that if the MBS purchase by the Fed lowered the spread between 
Treasuries and swaps, then there is a possibility that the Fed’s purchase has spillover effects on 
other financial assets. 
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In light of the survey of literature, numerous questions have emerged that haven’t been 
answered fully, which this paper attempts to accomplish.  They include: 
 Did the QEs decrease yields on all long-term nominal assets, including 
Treasuries, Agency bonds, corporate bonds, and MBS? 
 Were the effects of QE larger for longer duration assets? 
 Which round of QE was more effective? 
 Did QE raises yields on the most liquid assets such as Treasuries, relative to other 
less liquid assets. 
 Did QEs involving the purchase of Treasuries and agencies lower the yields on 
very safe assets such as treasuries, Agencies, and possible high-grade bonds, relative to 
less safe assets such as lower-grade corporate bonds or bonds with prepayment risk such 
as MBS? 
 Did QE affect only fixed income assets, or were there spillover effects into other 
types of financial assets? 
 Did QE depreciate the home currency?  
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1.3 Model, Dates, and Methodology 
1.3.1  Relevant Event Dates 
Following Gagnon et al (2010) and Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen (2011), this 
paper utilizes an event-study approach to examine the impact of all of the recent large-scale asset 
purchases based on announcements from the Fed of such purchases, spanning from the first 
announcement of QE1 on November 25, 2008 to the latest QE on December 12, 2012.  Including 
in this study are the three rounds of QE and two rounds of Operation Twist, spanning from the 
month before QE1 to one month after the latest announcement of QE3 tapering, October 1, 2008 
to August 31, 2014.  The following is a brief description of some notable announcement dates 
included in this study: 
QE1: 
 November 25, 2008 – The initial LSAP announcement in which the Federal 
Reserve announced it would purchase up to $100 billion in agency debt, and up to 
$500 billion in agency MBS. 
 December 1, 2008 – Chairman Bernanke gave a speech at the Greater Austin 
Chamber of Commerce, Austin Texas.  He reiterated the Fed’s purchasing plan 
over the next few quarters 
 December 16, 2008 – FOMC statement repeating the previous announcement that 
the Fed would purchase large quantities of agency debt and mortgage-backed 
securities to provide support to the mortgage and housing markets, and stood 
ready to expand purchase of agency debt and MBS as conditions warrant.  It also 
announced that the Committee is evaluating the potential benefits of purchasing 
longer-term Treasury securities. 
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 January 28, 2009 – FOMC statement reiterating the Fed’s purchasing plan. 
 March 18, 2009 – FOMC statement repeating the Fed’s continuing support to 
mortgage lending and housing markets by increasing the size of the Fed’s balance 
sheet further by purchasing up to an additional $750 billion of agency MBS, bring 
its total purchases of these securities to up to $1.25 trillion in 2009.  Moreover, 
the Fed announced increasing its purchase of agency debt that year by up to $100 
billion to a total of up to $200 billion.  Additionally, to help improve conditions in 
the private credit markets, the Committee decided to purchase up to $300 billion 
of longer-term Treasury securities over the next six months. 
QE2: 
 August 10, 2010 – FOMC statement announcing that “the Committee will keep 
constant the Federal Reserve’s holdings of securities at their current level by 
reinvesting principal payments from agency debt and agency MBS in longer-term 
Treasury securities.” 
 September 21, 2010 – FOMC statement announcing that the Fed would continue 
to maintain its existing policy of reinvesting principal payments from its securities 
holdings. 
 November 3, 2010 – FOMC statement announcing its intent to promote a stronger 
pace of economic recovery by maintaining its existing policy of reinvesting 
principal payments from its securities holdings.  In addition, the Committee 
planned to purchase a further $600 billion of longer-term Treasury securities by 





 September 13, 2012 – FOMC announced an open-ended commitment to purchase 
$40 billion agency MBS per month until the labor market improves substantially. 
 December 12, 2012 – FOMC statement to increase the amount of open-ended 
purchase from $40 billion to $85 billion per month. 
 September 18, 2013 – FOMC statement to continue purchasing additional agency 
MBS at a pace of $40 per month and longer-term Treasury securities at a pace of 
$45 billion per month.  This announcement is significant because the Fed changed 
its language on its press release regarding the nature of it asset purchasing 
program.  Since December 12, 2012, its press releases included the following two 
paragraphs: 
To support a stronger economic recovery and to help ensure 
that inflation, over time, is at the rate most consistent with its dual 
mandate, the Committee will continue purchasing additional agency 
mortgage-backed securities at a pace of $40 billion per month. The 
Committee also will purchase longer-term Treasury securities after 
its program to extend the average maturity of its holdings of 
Treasury securities is completed at the end of the year, initially at a 
pace of $45 billion per month. The Committee is maintaining its 
existing policy of reinvesting principal payments from its holdings 
of agency debt and agency mortgage-backed securities in agency 
mortgage-backed securities and, in January, will resume rolling 
over maturing Treasury securities at auction. Taken together, these 
actions should maintain downward pressure on longer-term interest 
rates, support mortgage markets, and help to make broader 
financial conditions more accommodative.  
The Committee will closely monitor incoming information 
on economic and financial developments in coming months. If the 
outlook for the labor market does not improve substantially, the 
Committee will continue its purchases of Treasury and agency 
mortgage-backed securities, and employ its other policy tools as 
appropriate, until such improvement is achieved in a context of 
price stability. In determining the size, pace, and composition of its 
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asset purchases, the Committee will, as always, take appropriate 
account of the likely efficacy and costs of such purchases. 6 
On September 18, 2013, it changed its language in the first paragraph regarding 
its asset purchasing program to the following: 
Taking into account the extent of federal fiscal retrenchment, 
the Committee sees the improvement in economic activity and labor 
market conditions since it began its asset purchase program a year 
ago as consistent with growing underlying strength in the broader 
economy.  However, the Committee decided to await more evidence 
that progress will be sustained before adjusting the pace of its 
purchases.  Accordingly, the Committee decided to continue 
purchasing additional agency mortgage-backed securities at a pace 
of $40 billion per month and longer-term Treasury securities at a 
pace of $45 billion per month.7 
 
 Tapering: 
 May 22, 2013 – Chairman Ben S. Bernanke Testimony Before the Joint Economic 
Committee, U.S. Congress, Washington, D.C., signaling the withdrawal of QE3 
for the first time. 
 December 18, 2013 – FOMC statement to begin tapering of QE3, at a pace of $35 
billion per month rather than $40 billion per month, and will add to its holdings of 
longer-term Treasury securities at a pace of $40 billion per month rather than $45 





                                                          
6 December 12, 2012 FOMC Statement. 
7 September 18, 2013 FOMC Statement. 
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Operation Twist (First Round) 
 September 21, 2011 – FOMC statement announcing the purchase of $400 billion 
of bonds with maturities of 6 to 30 years and to sell bonds with maturities of less 
than 3 years, thereby extending the average maturity of the Fed’s own portfolio. 
Operation Twist (Second Round) 
 June 20, 2012 – FOMC announced an extension to the Twist Program by 
additional $267 billion and extending the program through December 2012. 
 
For the announcement dates in QE1 and QE2, this paper uses the five dates selected by 
Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen (2011), but also included other QE announcement dates 
from FOMC up to the most recent time.  Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen (2011) remark 
on the identification issue for these five QE1 event dates that there is some uncertainty that the 
identified events are in fact the dominant events for the identified event day.  This is due to the 
possibility that other newsworthy economic news arriving through this period and potentially 
creating measurement error problems for their event study.  To remedy such potential problem 
for this paper, a thorough review on major newswires, including Dow Jones and Reuters, is 
conducted in order to ascertain that no other major economic news announcements were released 
on that date, and that there were no leaks of the Fed’s decision on QEs prior to the announcement 
dates. 
Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen (2011) also raise the issue of omitted event dates 
and how that would affect their event study.  They comment that while there is a possibility of 
other “true” event dates being excluded from their study, potentially reducing the power of tests 
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by increasing the noise in the sample.  Nonetheless, this exclusion of other event dates does not 
result in any biases. 
Furthermore, this paper includes more event dates than in literature, since a study on the 
impact of QE cannot be complete or unbiased if it only contained hand-selected dates that 
affected financial asset prices more than the other announcement dates as in the other studies.  
As such, besides running a baseline regression using the event dates from Krishnamurthy and 
Vissing-Jorgensen (2011), I also performed a robustness check, included all FOMC 
announcements regarding QE, not just the select, earlier ones that had more impact on the 





Table 1.1  List of Event Dates for Robustness Check 
 
QE1 
 November 25, 2008 
 December 1, 2008 
 December 16, 2008 
 December 30, 2008 
 January 28, 2009 
 March 18, 2009 
 April 29, 2009 
 June 24, 2009 
 August 12, 2009 
 September 23, 2009 
 November 4, 2009 
 December 16, 2009 
 January 27, 2010 
 March 16, 2010 
 
QE2 
 August 10, 2010 
 September 21, 2010 
 November 3, 2010 
 December 14, 2010 
 January 26, 2011 
 March 15, 2011 
 April 27, 2011 
 June 22, 2011 
 
QE3 
 September 13, 2012 
 October 24, 2012 
 December 12, 2012 
 January 30, 2013 
 March 20, 2013 
 May 1, 2013 
 June 19, 2013 
 July 31, 2013 
 September 18, 2013 
 October 30, 2013 
  
QE3 Tapering 
 May 22, 2013 
 December 18, 2013 
 January 29, 2013 
 March 19, 2014 
 April 30, 2014 
 June 18, 2014 
 July 30, 2014 
 
OT1 
 September 21, 2011 
 
OT2 




1.3.2  Data Description 
This paper is a comprehensive study on the effects of quantitative easing on all major 
asset classes in the financial markets, including equity, fixed-income, and foreign exchange  
This paper uses daily asset returns/yields for all the assets included in the study.  
Following Hasbrouk (2003) and Wang, Yang, Wu (2006), exchange-traded funds (ETFs) are 
used to measure equity and gold returns instead of broad market indices as the use of ETFs 
reveals new findings on the impact of monetary policy news on asset prices.  This is because 
ETFs are regularly and continuously traded, and circumvent the nonsynchronous trading problem 
of market indexes.  Therefore, ETFs more closely mimics real time trading behavior of other 
financial assets than that of cash market indexes.  The following is the list of assets included in 
this study: 
1. SPY – The SPDR® S&P 500® ETF – the exchange traded fund that seeks to provide 
investment results, before expenses, corresponding generally to the price and yield 
performance of the S&P 500® Index. 
2. MDY – The SPDR® S&P MIDCAP 400® ETF -- the exchange traded fund that seeks to 
provide investment results, before expenses, corresponding generally to the price and 
yield performance of the S&P® MidCap 400® IndexTM. 
3. IWM – iShares Russell 2000 ETF – the exchange traded fund that seeks to provide 
investment results, before expenses, corresponding generally to the price and yield 
performance of the S&P® MidCap 400® IndexTM. 
4. GLD -- The SPDR® Gold Shares ETF – the exchange traded fund that seeks to mimic the 
performance of the price of gold bullion, less expenses. 
5. Dollar per euro EUR 
6. Dollar per British pound GBP 
7. Dollar per Japanese yen YEN 
8. Dollar per Swiss franc CHF 
9. One-year treasury bill 
10. Three-year treasury note 
11. Five-year treasury note 
12. Ten-year treasury note 
13. Thirty-year treasury bond 
14. Moody’s corporate bonds rated Aaa  
15. Moody’s corporate bonds rated Baa  
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16. One-year interest rate swap8 
17. Three-year interest rate swap 
18. Five-year interest rate swap 
19. Ten-year interest rate swap  
20. Thirty-year interest rate swap  
21. Fannie Mae fixed rate fifteen-year mortgage 
22. Fannie Mae fixed rate thirty-year mortgage 
23. Freddie Mac fixed rate fifteen-year mortgage 
24. Freddie Mac fixed rate thirty-year mortgage 
 
 
1.3.3  Event-Study Methodology 
An event-study is conducted to measure the impact of QE announcements on the returns 
of different financial assets, following the literature including Bernanke, Reinhart, and Sack 
(2004), Gagnon et al (2010) and Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen (2011).  However, unlike 
Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen (2011) who used OLS with robust standard error for their 
event study, this paper uses the Seemingly Unrelated Regressions (SUR) estimator as in Wang, 
Yang, Wu (2006), since the SUR estimator is considered more efficient as compared to OLS.  
This is because the errors between the financial assets examined in this paper are likely to be 
contemporaneously correlated.  Adopting an alternative approach to time-series analysis, the 
event-study approach examines changes in asset yields around official communications 
regarding quantitative easing, while using the cumulative changes as a measure of the overall 
effects.  The dates selected for this study include only official Fed announcements, each 
disclosing new information regarding the potential or actual expansion of the size, composition, 
duration of the quantitative easing. 
                                                          
8 International Swaps and Derivatives Association (ISDA®) mid-market par swap rates. Rates are for a Fixed Rate Payer in 
return for receiving three month LIBOR, and are based on rates collected at 11:00 a.m. Eastern time by Thomson Reuters 




Using seemingly unrelated regression method, the responses of asset returns/yields are 
considered using both 1-day and 2-day event windows around the announcements, measured 
from the closing level the day prior to the announcement to the closing level the day after the 
announcement.  The reason for using a 2-day event-window instead of a 1-day event window is 
due to the challenge of conducting an event-study during a time of significant turmoil in 
financial markets, especially during the time span of the first quantitative easing, from the fall of 
2008 to the spring of 2009.  During this period, the prices of assets such as corporate bonds and 
CDSs may react slowly to Fed announcements due to lower liquidity versus other higher liquid 
assets such as Treasuries.  Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen (2011) deal with this issue by 
presenting 2-day windows for all assets.  They find that for assets that are less liquid, the changes 
in 2-day windows are almost always larger than the 1-day changes.  And for the higher liquid 
assets such as Treasuries, 2-day changes are almost the same as 1-day changes.  For this paper, 
regressions for event windows of both one day and two days are performed and reported, since 
my paper spans a wider time frame, and financial markets have since been more stable after the 
crisis period. 
The data set includes a zero-one dummy variable 𝐷𝜏,𝑡 in the return equation rather than 
modeling abnormal return as prediction errors from the market model equation, thus 
parameterizes the abnormal return in the market model regression equation [Binder (1998)].  The 
system of equations with one equation for each of the N assets experiencing the announcement 
dates from 𝑡1 to A.  The system comprises twenty-four regression equations: 
𝑅𝑁,𝑡 = 𝛾𝑁,𝜏𝐷𝜏,𝑡 + 𝑢𝑁,𝑡             𝑁 = 1, … , 24 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝜏 = 𝑡1, 𝑡2  
Each equation represents each asset examined in this paper, with a total of N = 24 assets, 
where 𝑅𝑁,𝑡 is the intraday return/yield for each asset, with a time frame from October 1, 2008 to 
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August 31, 2014.  Additionally, 𝐷𝜏,𝑡 is a dummy variable, which assumes the value of one on 
event day 𝑡 = 𝜏 and zero otherwise, where 𝜏 = 𝑡1, 𝑡2, … 𝐴 (and 𝜏 = 𝑡1, 𝑡1 + 1, … 𝐴, 𝐴 + 1 if a 
two-day event window is used).  The assumption is that error terms are independent across time, 
but may have cross equation contemporaneous correlations.  This method has been suggested by 
Jaffe (1974), Brown and Warner (1980, 1985), and Pynnönen (2005). 
In the hypothesis testing under SUR, whether the impacts of quantitative easing 
announcement has an impact on the various financial assets is examined by testing the null of 
𝛾1,𝜏 = 𝛾2,𝜏 = ⋯ = 𝛾𝑁,𝜏 = 0.  The dummy variables are the announcement dates for the three 




1.4  Empirical Results  
Tables 1.2 and 1.3 summarize the one-day and two-day return/yield changes (in basis 
points) for stocks, currencies, and treasuries.  The more notable changes are for the stock and 
currency markets for QE1, especially on December 1, 2008 – the day former Fed Chairman Ben 
Bernanke gave a speech on the Fed’s intent to stabilize the financial markets.  Table 3 
summarizes the one-day and two-day yield changes (in basis points) for corporate bonds, interest 
rate swaps, and MBSs.  The more notable changes are for the MBSs, particularly for QE1 
announcements. 
Tables 1.4 – 1.7 report regression results in this study, together with hypothesis tests of 
whether the different rounds of QE have the same effect on asset returns/yields.  First, baseline 
one-day and two-day event windows regressions are performed following QE1 and QE2 dates 
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used by Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen (2011).  Those regressions show that QE1 has a 
larger impact on financial assets than QE2.  Additionally, all the coefficients have the expected 
signs.  For instance, QE1 had a positive effect on stocks, lowered yields on fixed income assets, 
and depreciated the dollar against other major currencies.  However, this regression includes 
only certain select announcement dates, and does not tell the complete story of the effects of the 
Fed’s unconventional monetary policy on financial market.  Therefore, robustness check 
regressions are also performed for one-day and two-day events, using more official FOMC press 
release dates on these large-scale asset purchases.  Additionally, F-tests are also performed for all 







Table 1.2.  Equity, Currency, and Treasuries One-day and Two-day Return/Yield Changes (in basis points) 
 










11/25/2008 (QE1) 1-day 74 108 166 -5 86 190 222 82 0 -12 -18 -24 -15 
 2-day 463 756 775 -66 -56 94 175 -94 -2 -15 -23 -36 -24 
12/1/2008 (QE1) 1-day -886 -1026 -1124 -580 -63 -321 249 62 -9 -11 -22 -21 -23 
 2-day -535 -629 -657 -418 18 -297 252 62 -13 -15 -28 -25 -27 
12/16/2009 (QE1) 1-day 471 630 650 225 229 180 179 312 -5 -14 -16 -16 -12 
 2-day 369 701 747 343 535 150 393 814 -5 -4 -15 -33 -32 
1/28/2009 (QE1) 1-day 338 386 412 -109 5 84 -149 -77 1 7 11 12 18 
 2-day 2 41 4 127 -157 122 -116 -94 4 19 28 28 31 
3/18/2009 (QE1) 1-day 224 328 346 339 353 170 248 359 -9 -31 -46 -51 -26 
 2-day 97 246 237 479 499 334 431 526 -9 -24 -36 -41 -21 
8/10/2010 (QE2) 1-day -55 118 -188 28 -34 -25 58 7 -1 -3 -8 -7 -1 
 2-day -327 -459 -574 -5 -272 -147 71 -103 -1 -3 -10 -14 -8 
9/21/2010 (QE2) 1-day -20 55 -59 91 155 50 70 86 0 -5 -9 -11 -8 
 2-day -69 -136 -176 107 264 77 141 191 -1 -5 -10 -16 -13 
11/3/2010 (QE2) 1-day 40 32 39 -69 85 25 -57 90 0 -2 -4 4 16 
 2-day 233 217 293 267 123 142 -15 220 -1 -6 -11 -10 11 
9/13/2012 (QE3) 1-day 152 99 131 202 71 30 47 21 -1 -1 -5 -2 3 
 2-day 197 210 226 231 178 68 -69 113 0 2 2 11 17 
9/18/2013 (QE3) 1-day 22 18 55 12 -4 45 17 10 0 0 -1 -2 -1 
 2-day 80 75 77 -96 26 58 49 35 0 -7 -7 -4 2 
5/22/2013 (Tapering) 1-day -74 -170 -146 -71 -37 -69 -66 -85 -1 2 7 9 7 
 2-day -103 -180 -134 130 22 -31 45 14 0 3 7 8 6 
12/18/2013 (Tapering) 1-day 171 125 137 -88 -60 78 -154 -10 -1 -1 3 4 2 
 2-day 159 41 62 -323 -78 65 -151 -145 -1 5 11 9 3 
9/21/2011 (OT1) 1-day -295 -354 -370 -125 -94 -151 0 -137 2 7 3 -7 -17 
 2-day -608 -701 -639 -383 -173 -250 28 -231 1 4 -6 -23 -42 
6/20/2012 (OT2) 1-day -16 -7 -15 -76 17 -4 -76 15 2 2 3 1 -1 














Table 1.3  Corporate Bond, Swaps9 and MBS One-day and Two-day Yield Changes (in basis points) 
 


























11/25/2008 (QE1) 1-day -17 -9 -15 -25 -29 -33 -25 -28 -45 -38 -43 
 2-day -20 -16 -9 -21 -26 -32 -23 -54 -67 -64 -74 
12/1/2008 (QE1) 1-day -25 -19 -8 -15 -18 -17 -18 -32 -12 -27 -18 
 2-day -28 -24 -14 -22 -28 -24 -23 -21 -24 -2 -8 
12/16/2009 (QE1) 1-day -13 -15 -5 -7 -5 -4 -4 -11 -28 -22 -25 
 2-day -35 -41 -35 -41 -49 -54 -43 -24 -24 -15 -23 
1/28/2009 (QE1) 1-day 15 14 -6 -7 -8 -9 -11 -7 -7 -7 -16 
 2-day 27 22 -5 -2 1 5 6 22 42 21 46 
3/18/2009 (QE1) 1-day -24 -23 0 3 5 6 10 -22 -15 -24 -16 
 2-day -20 -17 -18 -25 -31 35 17 16 -31 -14 -31 
8/10/2010 (QE2) 1-day 2 3 0 3 2 0 -4 -5 -1 -2 -3 
 2-day -9 -6 -4 -7 -11 -13 -10 -11 -1 -9 -2 
9/21/2010 (QE2) 1-day -2 -8 -1 -4 -6 -6 -5 -12 -11 -12 -7 
 2-day -10 -13 -4 -11 -17 -19 -16 -9 -12 -10 -4 
11/3/2010 (QE2) 1-day 12 12 -2 -2 -4 -8 -8 -6 -2 -4 -5 
 2-day 9 6 -3 -7 -14 -11 1 -11 -7 -12 -11 
9/13/2012 (QE3) 1-day 3 1 -1 -2 -3 -2 0 -16 -24 -19 -23 
 2-day 11 8 -1 -1 1 8 16 -12 -13 -13 -13 
9/18/2013 (QE3) 1-day 0 1 0 2 2 2 1 -2 -2 -2 -3 
 2-day 3 3 -2 -8 -11 -8 -3 -5 -7 -5 -6 
5/22/2013 (Tapering) 1-day 6 6 0 0 0 1 2 9 10 8 10 
 2-day 5 4 1 3 5 7 5 18 15 18 13 
12/18/2013 (Tapering) 1-day 0 4 -1 -1 1 2 2 5 7 6 8 
 2-day -6 1 2 5 10 7 2 8 9 8 10 
9/21/2011 (OT1) 1-day -1 -16 -2 -3 -3 -4 -2 -1 -25 -7 -25 
 2-day -21 -26 4 2 -5 -19 -32 -20 -38 -16 -13 
6/20/2012 (OT2) 1-day -3 -2 -2 0 1 4 7 5 7 6 7 
 2-day -6 -7 1 3 2 -1 -1 -1 2 0 2 
 
  
                                                          
9 International Swaps and Derivatives Association (ISDA®) mid-market par swap rates. Rates are for a Fixed Rate Payer in return for receiving three month LIBOR, and are 
based on rates collected at 11:00 a.m. Eastern time by Thomson Reuters and published on Thomson Reuters Page ISDAFIX®1. ISDAFIX is a registered service mark of 






1.4.1  Baseline One-Day and Two-Day Event Windows Regressions 
Table 1.4 Panels A and B summarized baseline regression results for 1-day event window 
for all quantitative easing and Operation Twist announcements from October 1, 2008 to August 
31, 2014, using the same QE1 and QE2 dates as Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen (2011).  
According to regression results, QE1 had the largest impact on equities, fixed income assets, and 
currencies.  One notable result is for Operation Twist round one, that it had enormous negative 
impacts, especially on equities.  This was mostly due to investors disappointed by the amount of 
purchase for OT1.  Additionally, OT1 and OT2 had the intended effects of increasing short-term 
treasury yields and decreasing long-term treasury yields, thereby “twisting” the yield curve.  
While one-day event window hypothesis tests are significant for fixed income assets, two-day 
event windows are significant for most of assets in this study. 
 Table 1.5 Panels A and B report the two-day event window regressions, and they have 
similar results as one-day results.  According to both of these results, QE1 has much larger and 
statistically significant results vs. QE2 and QE3.  The overall effect of tapering is still debatable, 
even though current literature believes that tapering is damaging to financial markets.  However, 
regression results so far do not support that, as it is still an ongoing process and a more 
appropriate study needs to be done after it ends.  Moreover, the first round of Operation Twist 





Table 1.4 Panel A.  Baseline Regression with 1-day Event Window 
 









0.0744*** -0.112*** -0.122*** -0.0794** 
 (0.730) (0.854) (0.907) (0.633) (0.341) (0.326) (0.350) (0.371) (0.0115) (0.0229) (0.0298) (0.0319) (0.0310) 
QE2 -0.167 -0.538 -0.753 0.130 0.660* 0.170 0.232 0.600 -0.00231 -0.0327 -0.0695** -0.0461 0.0240 
 (0.842) (0.985) (1.047) (0.730) (0.393) (0.376) (0.404) (0.429) (0.0133) (0.0264) (0.0344) (0.0369) (0.0358) 
QE3 -0.0431 -0.251 -0.430 0.344 0.295 0.173 -0.177 0.326 -0.00297 -0.00639 -0.00850 0.000614 0.0106 
 (0.462) (0.541) (0.575) (0.401) (0.216) (0.206) (0.222) (0.235) (0.00729) (0.0145) (0.0189) (0.0202) (0.0197) 
Tapering 0.0232 -0.189 -0.125 -0.430 -0.151 -0.00413 -0.351 -0.274 0.00103 0.0135 0.0262 0.0235 0.0192 
 (0.552) (0.646) (0.687) (0.479) (0.258) (0.246) (0.265) (0.281) (0.00870) (0.0173) (0.0226) (0.0242) (0.0235) 
OT1 -2.996** -3.603** -3.763** -1.283 -0.936 -1.502** -0.00305 -1.380* 0.0210 0.0706 0.0305 -0.0694 -0.169*** 
 (1.458) (1.705) (1.813) (1.264) (0.681) (0.650) (0.700) (0.742) (0.0230) (0.0457) (0.0596) (0.0638) (0.0620) 
OT2 -0.213 -0.137 -0.214 -0.794 0.179 -0.0409 -0.761 0.139 0.0210 0.0206 0.0305 0.0106 -0.00936 
 (1.458) (1.705) (1.813) (1.264) (0.681) (0.650) (0.700) (0.742) (0.0230) (0.0457) (0.0596) (0.0638) (0.0620) 
Constant 0.0506 0.0669 0.0612 0.0369 -0.00592 -0.00358 0.00305 0.0128 -0.00103* -0.000614 -0.000503 -0.000614 -0.000641 
 (0.0383) (0.0448) (0.0476) (0.0332) (0.0179) (0.0171) (0.0184) (0.0195) (0.000603) (0.00120) (0.00157) (0.00167) (0.00163) 
No. Obs. 1,476 1,476 1,476 1,476 1,476 1,476 1,476 1,476 1,476 1,476 1,476 1,476 1,476 
R-squared 0.003 0.003 0.004 0.004 0.007 0.005 0.011 0.010 0.006 0.010 0.014 0.012 0.010 
F-stat 3.99 4.17 4.17 5.78 7.93 6.96 16.65*** 12.48** 8.46 14.13** 17.62*** 15.83*** 15.15*** 






Table 1.4 Panel B.  Baseline Regression with 1-day Event Window 
 









QE1 -0.0987*** -0.0704** -0.0833*** -0.134*** -0.149*** -0.157*** -0.144*** -0.159*** -0.194*** -0.149*** -0.173* 
 (0.0327) (0.0317) (0.0140) (0.0241) (0.0298) (0.0328) (0.0320) (0.0347) (0.0359) (0.0346) (0.0956) 
QE2 0.0413 0.0255 -0.00828 -0.00872 -0.0256 -0.0458 -0.0560 -0.0730* -0.0450 -0.0607 -0.0469 
 (0.0378) (0.0366) (0.0162) (0.0278) (0.0344) (0.0378) (0.0369) (0.0401) (0.0415) (0.0399) (0.110) 
QE3 0.0113 0.00913 -0.000276 0.00328 0.0161 0.0189 0.0197 -0.0201 -0.0273 -0.0205 -0.0276 
 (0.0207) (0.0201) (0.00890) (0.0153) (0.0189) (0.0208) (0.0203) (0.0220) (0.0228) (0.0219) (0.0606) 
Tapering 0.0128 0.0207 0.00315 -0.00157 -0.00606 0.000869 0.00354 0.0252 0.0294 0.0237 0.0321 
 (0.0248) (0.0240) (0.0106) (0.0183) (0.0225) (0.0248) (0.0242) (0.0263) (0.0272) (0.0262) (0.0724) 
OT1 -0.00867 -0.158** -0.0183 -0.0287 -0.0289 -0.0391 -0.0193 -0.103 -0.245*** -0.0663 -0.249 
 (0.0654) (0.0633) (0.0281) (0.0482) (0.0595) (0.0654) (0.0639) (0.0694) (0.0718) (0.0691) (0.191) 
OT2 -0.0287 -0.0179 -0.0183 0.00128 0.0111 0.0409 0.0707 0.0487 0.0725 0.0603 0.0683 
 (0.0654) (0.0633) (0.0281) (0.0482) (0.0595) (0.0654) (0.0639) (0.0694) (0.0718) (0.0691) (0.191) 
Constant -0.00133 -0.00213 -0.00172** -0.00128 -0.00108 -0.000869 -0.000683 -0.00131 -0.000868 -0.00143 -0.000954 
 (0.00172) (0.00166) (0.000737) (0.00127) (0.00156) (0.00172) (0.00168) (0.00182) (0.00188) (0.00181) (0.00501) 
No. Obs. 1,476 1,476 1,476 1,476 1,476 1,476 1,476 1,476 1,476 1,476 1,476 
R-squared 0.007 0.009 0.024 0.021 0.018 0.017 0.017 0.019 0.030 0.016 0.004 
F-stat 10.99* 12.48** 29.58*** 26.01*** 23.17*** 23.09*** 22.88*** 21.89*** 35.82*** 18.91*** 4.51 











Table 1.5 Panel A.  Baseline Regression with 2-Day Event Window 
 




QE1 0.392 1.097** 1.108* 0.431 0.834*** 0.408** 1.126*** 1.185*** -0.0241*** -0.0383*** -0.0735*** -0.107*** -0.0727*** 
 (0.461) (0.539) (0.574) (0.400) (0.215) (0.206) (0.221) (0.234) (0.00728) (0.0145) (0.0189) (0.0201) (0.0195) 
QE2 -0.330 -0.707 -0.838 0.580 0.194 0.122 0.326 0.501* -0.00408 -0.0227 -0.0512** -0.0664** -0.0163 
 (0.595) (0.695) (0.740) (0.516) (0.278) (0.265) (0.284) (0.301) (0.00939) (0.0187) (0.0244) (0.0259) (0.0251) 
QE3 -0.142 -0.141 -0.239 -0.216 0.0214 0.102 -0.400** 0.0762 -7.88e-05 0.00565 0.0170 0.0253* 0.0243* 
 (0.327) (0.382) (0.407) (0.284) (0.153) (0.146) (0.156) (0.166) (0.00517) (0.0103) (0.0134) (0.0142) (0.0138) 
Tapering -0.0619 -0.212 -0.181 -0.288 -0.123 -0.0152 -0.138 -0.173 -0.00194 0.00923 0.0169 0.0175 0.0118 
 (0.390) (0.456) (0.485) (0.339) (0.182) (0.174) (0.187) (0.198) (0.00616) (0.0123) (0.0160) (0.0170) (0.0165) 
OT1 -3.144*** -3.637*** -3.309*** -1.969** -0.863* -1.255*** 0.139 -1.170** 0.00592 0.0207 -0.0295 -0.115** -0.210*** 
 (1.028) (1.202) (1.279) (0.892) (0.480) (0.459) (0.492) (0.521) (0.0162) (0.0324) (0.0421) (0.0447) (0.0435) 
OT2 -1.258 -1.412 -1.354 -1.685* -0.565 -0.419 -0.839* -0.577 0.00592 0.0107 0.0105 -0.00468 -0.0247 
 (1.028) (1.202) (1.279) (0.892) (0.480) (0.459) (0.492) (0.521) (0.0162) (0.0324) (0.0421) (0.0447) (0.0435) 
Constant 0.0549 0.0673 0.0612 0.0381 -0.00568 -0.00444 0.00224 0.00949 -0.000921 -0.000654 -0.000499 -0.000316 -0.000331 
 (0.0385) (0.0450) (0.0479) (0.0334) (0.0180) (0.0172) (0.0184) (0.0195) (0.000609) (0.00121) (0.00158) (0.00168) (0.00163) 
No. Obs. 1,476 1,476 1,476 1,476 1,476 1,476 1,476 1,476 1,476 1,476 1,476 1,476 1,476 
R-squared 0.008 0.011 0.009 0.008 0.014 0.009 0.025 0.024 0.008 0.007 0.015 0.030 0.027 
F-stat 11.13** 15.58*** 12.73** 11.48** 19.55*** 12.50** 37.60*** 32.16*** 8.99 9.46* 21.66*** 41.77*** 39.70*** 
























QE1 -0.0750*** -0.0742*** -0.0796*** -0.110*** -0.132*** -0.140*** -0.0997*** -0.0913*** -0.102*** -0.0725*** -0.0894 
 (0.0207) (0.0200) (0.00876) (0.0151) (0.0186) (0.0205) (0.0202) (0.0220) (0.0228) (0.0220) (0.0607) 
QE2 -0.0157 -0.0199 -0.0169 -0.0406** -0.0693*** -0.0713*** -0.0413 -0.0522* -0.0333 -0.0486* -0.0275 
 (0.0266) (0.0258) (0.0113) (0.0195) (0.0240) (0.0265) (0.0260) (0.0284) (0.0294) (0.0283) (0.0782) 
QE3 0.0255* 0.0233 0.000449 0.00803 0.0212 0.0243* 0.0253* 0.0141 0.0170 0.0179 0.0208 
 (0.0147) (0.0142) (0.00621) (0.0107) (0.0132) (0.0146) (0.0143) (0.0156) (0.0162) (0.0156) (0.0430) 
Tapering 0.00101 0.00536 0.00359 0.0139 0.0150 0.0118 0.00461 0.0183 0.0191 0.0202 0.0193 
 (0.0175) (0.0169) (0.00741) (0.0128) (0.0158) (0.0174) (0.0171) (0.0186) (0.0193) (0.0186) (0.0513) 
OT1 -0.104** -0.128*** 0.0214 0.0110 -0.0243 -0.0947** -0.160*** -0.0971** -0.190*** -0.0761 -0.0615 
 (0.0461) (0.0446) (0.0195) (0.0338) (0.0416) (0.0458) (0.0450) (0.0491) (0.0509) (0.0490) (0.135) 
OT2 -0.0290 -0.0332 0.00645 0.0160 0.0107 -0.00468 -0.00468 -0.00260 0.0123 0.00257 0.0133 
 (0.0461) (0.0446) (0.0195) (0.0338) (0.0416) (0.0458) (0.0450) (0.0491) (0.0509) (0.0490) (0.135) 
Constant -0.00101 -0.00179 -0.00145** -0.00103 -0.000703 -0.000323 -0.000323 -0.00134 -0.000988 -0.00163 -0.00136 
 (0.00173) (0.00167) (0.000732) (0.00127) (0.00156) (0.00171) (0.00169) (0.00184) (0.00191) (0.00183) (0.00507) 
Observations 1,476 1,476 1,476 1,476 1,476 1,476 1,476 1,476 1,476 1,476 1,476 
R-squared 0.015 0.017 0.055 0.039 0.041 0.040 0.028 0.017 0.025 0.013 0.002 
F-stat 20.67*** 24.20*** 72.04*** 52.41*** 56.11*** 53.22*** 38.43*** 23.37*** 34.39*** 17.84*** 2.79 







 1.4.2  Robustness Check One-Day and Two-Day Event Windows Regressions 
 A robustness check regression is also performed, which included more QE1 and QE2 
dates, all of those dates are official press releases by the FOMC that Krishnamurthy and Vissing-
Jorgensen (2011) omitted.  See Table 1 for the list of complete dates in these regressions.  
Regression results are reported in Tables 6 – 7.  Robustness check show similar results as the 
original regressions, with positive effects on equity returns with statistically significant results, 
and negative effects on fixed-income yields, also with mostly statistically significant results.  
Hypothesis tests on whether the different rounds of QE have the same effects are also performed.  
In most cases, the null hypothesis is rejected, thereby affirming that different rounds of QEs are 





Table 1.6 Panel A.  Robustness Check Regression with 1-Day Event Window 
 
SPY MDY IWM GLD EUR GBP YEN CHF 1Y T-Bill 3Y T-Note 5Y T-Note 10Y T-Note 
30Y T-
Bond 
QE1 0.633* 0.865* 0.936* 0.0767 0.583*** 0.452*** 0.368* 0.481** -0.0212*** -0.0438*** -0.0589*** -0.0601*** -0.0278* 
 (0.391) (0.457) (0.486) (0.340) (0.182) (0.174) (0.189) (0.199) (0.00616) (0.0123) (0.0160) (0.0171) (0.0166) 
QE2 -0.166 -0.183 -0.252 0.171 0.353 -0.00284 0.0931 0.470* -0.000337 0.00424 0.00668 0.0256 0.0445** 
 (0.516) (0.604) (0.642) (0.449) (0.241) (0.230) (0.249) (0.263) (0.00813) (0.0162) (0.0212) (0.0226) (0.0220) 
QE3 -0.0375 -0.244 -0.421 0.349 0.300 0.176 -0.177 0.329 -0.00309 -0.00651 -0.00857 0.000606 0.0108 
 (0.462) (0.540) (0.574) (0.401) (0.216) (0.206) (0.223) (0.235) (0.00728) (0.0145) (0.0189) (0.0203) (0.0197) 
Tapering 0.0289 -0.181 -0.116 -0.426 -0.146 -0.00107 -0.351 -0.270 0.000913 0.0133 0.0261 0.0235 0.0194 
 (0.552) (0.645) (0.686) (0.479) (0.257) (0.246) (0.266) (0.281) (0.00869) (0.0173) (0.0226) (0.0242) (0.0235) 
OT1 -2.991** -3.595** -3.755** -1.278 -0.931 -1.499** -0.00291 -1.376* 0.0209 0.0705 0.0304 -0.0694 -0.169*** 
 (1.456) (1.703) (1.811) (1.265) (0.680) (0.649) (0.702) (0.742) (0.0229) (0.0457) (0.0597) (0.0639) (0.0620) 
OT2 -0.207 -0.129 -0.205 -0.789 0.184 -0.0379 -0.761 0.142 0.0209 0.0205 0.0304 0.0106 -0.00921 
 (1.456) (1.703) (1.811) (1.265) (0.680) (0.649) (0.702) (0.742) (0.0229) (0.0457) (0.0597) (0.0639) (0.0620) 
Constant 0.0449 0.0589 0.0526 0.0322 -0.0103 -0.00664 0.00291 0.00936 -0.000913 -0.000488 -0.000425 -0.000606 -0.000787 
 (0.0384) (0.0450) (0.0478) (0.0334) (0.0179) (0.0171) (0.0185) (0.0196) (0.000605) (0.00121) (0.00158) (0.00169) (0.00164) 
Observations 1,476 1,476 1,476 1,476 1,476 1,476 1,476 1,476 1,476 1,476 1,476 1,476 1,476 
R-squared 0.005 0.006 0.006 0.002 0.011 0.009 0.005 0.010 0.009 0.011 0.011 0.011 0.010 
F-stat 6.80 8.36 8.75 3.15 8.80 10.42* 7.51 10.44* 10.51* 13.83** 13.22** 14.21** 15.42*** 























QE1 -0.0457*** -0.0306* -0.0262*** -0.0330** -0.0332** -0.0319* -0.0256 -0.0696*** -0.0671*** -0.0731*** -0.0872* 
 (0.0175) (0.0170) (0.00759) (0.0130) (0.0161) (0.0177) (0.0173) (0.0187) (0.0194) (0.0186) (0.0513) 
QE2 0.0602*** 0.0523** -0.00581 -0.0112 -0.0201 -0.0266 -0.0254 0.0143 0.0127 0.0269 0.0110 
 (0.0232) (0.0224) (0.0100) (0.0172) (0.0212) (0.0233) (0.0228) (0.0247) (0.0256) (0.0245) (0.0677) 
QE3 0.0114 0.00926 -0.000314 0.00329 0.0161 0.0189 0.0198 -0.0201 -0.0273 -0.0205 -0.0279 
 (0.0207) (0.0201) (0.00897) (0.0154) (0.0190) (0.0209) (0.0204) (0.0221) (0.0229) (0.0219) (0.0606) 
Tapering 0.0128 0.0208 0.00311 -0.00157 -0.00603 0.000941 0.00367 0.0252 0.0294 0.0236 0.0319 
 (0.0247) (0.0240) (0.0107) (0.0184) (0.0227) (0.0249) (0.0244) (0.0264) (0.0273) (0.0262) (0.0724) 
OT1 -0.00859 -0.158** -0.0183 -0.0287 -0.0289 -0.0391 -0.0192 -0.103 -0.245*** -0.0663 -0.249 
 (0.0653) (0.0633) (0.0283) (0.0486) (0.0599) (0.0659) (0.0644) (0.0696) (0.0722) (0.0692) (0.191) 
OT2 -0.0286 -0.0177 -0.0183 0.00129 0.0111 0.0409 0.0708 0.0487 0.0726 0.0603 0.0681 
 (0.0653) (0.0633) (0.0283) (0.0486) (0.0599) (0.0659) (0.0644) (0.0696) (0.0722) (0.0692) (0.191) 
Constant -0.00141 -0.00226 -0.00169** -0.00129 -0.00111 -0.000941 -0.000808 -0.00131 -0.000917 -0.00141 -0.000749 
 (0.00172) (0.00167) (0.000746) (0.00128) (0.00158) (0.00174) (0.00170) (0.00184) (0.00191) (0.00183) (0.00504) 
Observations 1,476 1,476 1,476 1,476 1,476 1,476 1,476 1,476 1,476 1,476 1,476 
R-squared 0.010 0.011 0.009 0.005 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.012 0.018 0.013 0.003 
F-stat 14.44** 16.00*** 7.60 4.08 4.40 4.96 5.26 14.35** 22.04*** 16.52*** 3.93 







Table 1.7 Panel A.  Robustness Check Regression with 2-Day Event Window 
 
SPY MDY IWM GLD EUR GBP YEN CHF 1Y T-Bill 3Y T-Note 5Y T-Note 10Y T-Note 
30Y T-
Bond 
QE1 0.490* 0.829** 0.844** 0.0578 0.295** 0.244** 0.274** 0.339** -0.0149*** -0.0268*** -0.0369*** -0.0418*** -0.0264** 
 (0.277) (0.324) (0.345) (0.241) (0.130) (0.124) (0.134) (0.142) (0.00438) (0.00873) (0.0114) (0.0122) (0.0118) 
QE2 -0.319 -0.339 -0.325 -0.0481 -0.0163 -0.126 0.141 0.293 -0.00360 -0.0159 -0.0222 -0.0178 0.00292 
 (0.365) (0.427) (0.454) (0.317) (0.171) (0.163) (0.176) (0.186) (0.00577) (0.0115) (0.0150) (0.0160) (0.0155) 
QE3 -0.138 -0.133 -0.230 -0.221 0.0204 0.102 -0.403** 0.0758 -0.000225 0.00532 0.0168 0.0253* 0.0244* 
 (0.327) (0.382) (0.407) (0.284) (0.153) (0.146) (0.158) (0.167) (0.00517) (0.0103) (0.0134) (0.0143) (0.0139) 
Tapering -0.0573 -0.205 -0.172 -0.293 -0.124 -0.0151 -0.140 -0.174 -0.00208 0.00889 0.0167 0.0175 0.0119 
 (0.390) (0.456) (0.485) (0.339) (0.183) (0.174) (0.188) (0.199) (0.00616) (0.0123) (0.0160) (0.0171) (0.0165) 
OT1 -3.139*** -3.630*** -3.300*** -1.974** -0.864* -1.255*** 0.137 -1.170** 0.00577 0.0203 -0.0297 -0.115** -0.210*** 
 (1.027) (1.201) (1.278) (0.893) (0.482) (0.459) (0.495) (0.525) (0.0162) (0.0324) (0.0422) (0.0450) (0.0436) 
OT2 -1.253 -1.405 -1.345 -1.689* -0.566 -0.419 -0.841* -0.577 0.00577 0.0103 0.0103 -0.00468 -0.0246 
 (1.027) (1.201) (1.278) (0.893) (0.482) (0.459) (0.495) (0.525) (0.0162) (0.0324) (0.0422) (0.0450) (0.0436) 
Constant 0.0503 0.0596 0.0526 0.0430 -0.00462 -0.00445 0.00454 0.00996 -0.000775 -0.000316 -0.000258 -0.000323 -0.000423 
 (0.0389) (0.0455) (0.0484) (0.0338) (0.0182) (0.0174) (0.0188) (0.0199) (0.000615) (0.00123) (0.00160) (0.00171) (0.00165) 
Observations 1,476 1,476 1,476 1,476 1,476 1,476 1,476 1,476 1,476 1,476 1,476 1,476 1,476 
R-squared 0.010 0.012 0.010 0.007 0.007 0.009 0.010 0.010 0.008 0.009 0.011 0.016 0.021 
F-stat 14.93* 18.14*** 14.84** 8.20 9.95* 13.07** 15.00** 13.40** 7.15 9.89* 13.62** 21.37*** 31.48*** 



























QE1 -0.0366*** -0.0339*** -0.0377*** -0.0452*** -0.0491*** -0.0490*** -0.0321*** -0.0476*** -0.0523*** -0.0444*** -0.0587 
 (0.0125) (0.0121) (0.00533) (0.00920) (0.0113) (0.0125) (0.0122) (0.0133) (0.0138) (0.0132) (0.0365) 
QE2 0.00342 0.00301 -0.00623 -0.0229* -0.0351** -0.0316* -0.0171 -0.00985 -0.00281 -0.00687 -0.000196 
 (0.0164) (0.0159) (0.00702) (0.0121) (0.0149) (0.0164) (0.0161) (0.0175) (0.0181) (0.0174) (0.0481) 
QE3 0.0254* 0.0233 0.000270 0.00783 0.0211 0.0243* 0.0254* 0.0139 0.0168 0.0176 0.0204 
 (0.0147) (0.0142) (0.00628) (0.0109) (0.0134) (0.0147) (0.0144) (0.0157) (0.0162) (0.0156) (0.0430) 
Tapering 0.000918 0.00534 0.00341 0.0137 0.0149 0.0117 0.00466 0.0181 0.0189 0.0200 0.0188 
 (0.0175) (0.0170) (0.00749) (0.0129) (0.0160) (0.0176) (0.0172) (0.0187) (0.0194) (0.0186) (0.0513) 
OT1 -0.104** -0.128*** 0.0213 0.0108 -0.0244 -0.0947** -0.160*** -0.0973** -0.191*** -0.0764 -0.0619 
 (0.0462) (0.0447) (0.0197) (0.0341) (0.0420) (0.0463) (0.0452) (0.0492) (0.0510) (0.0490) (0.135) 
OT2 -0.0291 -0.0332 0.00627 0.0158 0.0106 -0.00471 -0.00463 -0.00279 0.0121 0.00233 0.0129 
 (0.0462) (0.0447) (0.0197) (0.0341) (0.0420) (0.0463) (0.0452) (0.0492) (0.0510) (0.0490) (0.135) 
Constant -0.000918 -0.00176 -0.00127* -0.000832 -0.000567 -0.000287 -0.000373 -0.00116 -0.000790 -0.00140 -0.000949 
 (0.00175) (0.00169) (0.000747) (0.00129) (0.00159) (0.00175) (0.00171) (0.00186) (0.00193) (0.00185) (0.00512) 
Observations 1,476 1,476 1,476 1,476 1,476 1,476 1,476 1,476 1,476 1,476 1,476 
R-squared 0.012 0.013 0.034 0.020 0.019 0.018 0.016 0.013 0.020 0.011 0.002 
F-stat 15.91*** 18.30*** 36.14*** 22.30*** 22.32*** 21.06*** 21.34*** 15.71*** 27.10*** 14.64*** 2.84 








1.5 Concluding Remarks 
This chapter is a complete and thorough study on the effects of LSAPs since the financial 
crisis of 2008 on all sectors of the financial market.  All of the major equity and fixed income 
assets are included in this study, as well as major currency pairs against the U.S. dollar.  The 
large scale purchases included in this study are the three rounds of quantitative easing, with the 
third round in the process of tapering, and the two rounds of operation twist.  An event study 
approach is taken, similar to other research papers on quantitative easing. 
Empirical results show that the three rounds of QE decreased yield on all long-term 
nominal assets, including Treasuries, Agency bonds, corporate bonds, and MBS.  This was the 
intention of the Fed since it announced the first round of these large-scale asset purchases in 
2008.  Additionally, the effects of QE are larger for longer duration assets, another intended goal 
set out by the Fed.  Evidence shows that the first round of QE was the most effective.  While the 
second and third rounds of quantitative easing also had intended effects on most of the assets 
examined in this paper, the first round of quantitative easing had a larger effect, with results 
statistically significant.   
Moreover, QE also affected other financial assets, as evidenced by the increase in the 
return of equity markets over the announcement periods.  Lastly, QE depreciated the home 
currency against other major currencies. 
While the first quantitative easing had the intended effects of lowering the cost and 
increasing the availability of credit for the purchase of houses, which in turn should support 
housing markets and foster improved conditions in financial markets more generally, the impacts 
of subsequent rounds of quantitative easing, as well as Operation Twists, are minimal.  This 
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opens up the debate of whether the Fed should discontinue its asset purchases, instead of its 
current action of merely tapering off QE. 
Evidence of the Fed’s actions affecting other financial markets besides the intended bond 
market should alert policy-makers to device more prudent unconventional monetary policy in the 
future, since the Fed’s QE actions could have caused the current stock market bubble. 
 At the time of this chapter’s writing, the Fed’s large-scale asset purchase is still ongoing, 
albeit at a reduced rate of $10 billion per month for agency MBS, and $20 billion per month for 
long-term Treasury securities10.  A possible research suggestion in the future is to conduct a 
comprehensive study of the conclusion of the Fed’s asset purchasing program using the same 
methodology as this chapter.  
                                                          
10 July 30, 2014 FOMC Statement. 
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Chapter 2 Tapering News and Emerging Markets 
2.1 Introduction 
On September 13, 2012, the Federal Reserve announced the third round of its asset 
purchase program, known as quantitative easing (QE).  While at that time, U.S. economic 
activity had improved at a moderate pace, employment was weak and unemployment rate 
remained at elevated levels.  Since inflation was low, and longer-term inflation expectation had 
remained stable, the Federal Reserve decided to begin purchasing long-term securities and 
increase its holdings of agency debt and mortgage backed securities (MBS) at the pace of $85 
billion each month.  The intention was to put downward pressure on longer-term interest rates, 
support mortgage markets, and help to further stimulate economic growth. 
Since then, financial markets had been anxiously speculating when the Federal Reserve 
would decide to discontinue the unconventional monetary stimulus, especially given that the 
economy was gradually improving.  That expectation of the Fed’s decision to end the third round 
of quantitative easing (QE3), also known as tapering, has sometimes caused panic and 
overreaction in the financial markets, in the U.S. and abroad. 
Observers were especially concerned about the impact of the Fed’s credit policy having 
the potential to affect not only domestic financial markets, but asset prices globally. 
Policymakers in emerging markets maintained vehemently that QE policies have created 
disproportionate global liquidity. One of the spillover effects of QE was a sudden surge of capital 
inflows, particularly to emerging markets (EMEs), triggering currency appreciation and financial 
imbalances in these economies. Thus, a sudden withdrawal of funds out of EMEs by way of QE 
tapering raised fears of financial instability in these countries. 
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On May 22, 2013, former Fed chairman Ben Bernanke gave a testimony before the Joint 
Economic Committee of the U.S. Congress, hinting of QE tapering in the near future11. He noted 
the improvement in the U.S. job market that could enable the Fed to take a step down in the pace 
of asset purchase. Markets reacted strongly to his comments, sending financial markets around 
the world in havoc. Figure 1 below shows how emerging equity markets reacted to QE3. 
September 13, 2012 marks the announcement of QE3, while the equity markets of EMEs were in 
the midst of a bull market. After May 22, 2013, the day of Ben Bernanke’s testimony to 
Congress hinting at tapering, EME equity markets declined while rumors of tapering kept stock 
prices down. 
 
Figure 2.1     iShares MSCI Emerging Markets ETF price movements from the start of QE3 to start of 
tapering. The first vertical line marks September 13, 2012, the beginning of QE3; the second marks the date 
of Ben Bernanke’s May 22, 2013 speech signaling tapering; the third marks the official announcement of 
tapering, December 18, 2013. 









































Existing literature widely documents the vulnerability of emerging economies to episodes 
of sudden surges and stops of capital flows out of the U.S. during the periods of asset purchases 
by the Fed.  Forbes & Warnock (2012) analyze episodes of extreme capital flow movements, 
identifying instances of sharp increases and decreases in capital inflows and outflows. They find 
a significant relationship between global, contagion, and domestic factors and extreme 
movements in capital flows, and this relationship has important implications for economic 
policy. Especially for emerging economies, capital flow volatility can have significant economic 
costs, as past work finds that surges and stops of foreign funds are correlated with currency 
crises and other financial woes. Policymakers hoping to reduce these vulnerabilities and 
moderate these negative impacts are recommended to clearly identify these episodes and 
understand the underlying implications. 
Broner, Didier, Erce, & Schmukler (2013) provide a systematic cross-country analysis of 
the cyclical behavior of the different types of gross capital flows over the business cycle, as well 
as during times of financial crises. The authors find that from the 1970s to the 2000s, the 
magnitude and volatility of gross capital flows increased and became larger, and gross capital 
flows are pro-cyclical. 
Thus, the consensus prediction of the Fed’s tapering decision is that capital would flow 
out of emerging economies in amounts to have significant negative impacts on these countries. 
However, these works focus on the causes and effects of capital flow. Moreover, current 
literature on QE focuses on the effects of this unconventional monetary policy on U.S. markets. 




This paper is one of the first attempts in the literature to examine the effects of the Fed’s 
announcements and related news on QE3 and tapering on emerging market economies. While a 
few prior works in literature examined the impacts of QE3 on EMEs [Eichengreen & Gupta 
(2014) and Aizenman, Binici, & Hutchison (2014)], they focus on just the tapering part of QE3. 
This paper describes a more complete picture of the effects of QE3 on EMEs by following the 
path of events of QE3 from the beginning to the current retrenchment status. Using an event-
study approach on a panel of fifteen EMEs, following the framework of Aizenman, Binici, & 
Hutchison (2014), this paper examines how QE3 affects the exchange rates and financial asset 
prices of these fifteen countries, from the Fed’s announcement to begin its large-scale asset 
purchases, to the current gradual withdrawal. Using an event study methodology enables this 
study to identify the immediate effect of the news announcements triggering changes of key 
financial asset prices. 
Of interest are financial asset prices of country ETFs and exchange rates. The news 
announcements included are the official FOMC press release dates related to QE3, statements 
from top Fed official such as the chairman, governors, and bank presidents, as well as releases of 
major U.S. economic data that might affect market expectations on further easing or tapering. 
For instance, a positive U.S. GDP growth signals that the U.S. economy is improving and might 
influence the Fed to start tapering. A negative unemployment report is a signal that the Fed needs 
to continue easing. 
The paper is structured as follows.  Section 2 is a survey of current literature on the 
impact of tapering on emerging markets.  Section 3 describes the data, model, and methodology.  




2.2 Literature Review 
There is a dearth of literature on the effects of tapering on financial assets, especially in 
emerging markets. Past literature focused on conventional monetary policy, such as the Federal 
Reserve’s target of the federal funds rate. 
Similar to these studies, this paper is an attempt to understand how exchange rates and 
stock markets in emerging markets react to news announcements. This paper is different in that it 
analyzes returns of assets that are trading contemporaneously with their U.S. counterparts, 
particularly the ones actively trading at the time of day of the announcement dates. This is an 
effort to solve potential problem in previous studies of the response of financial asset prices to 
monetary policy announcements, where the variables include asset prices in foreign financial 
markets that are in different time zones as the U.S. market. In particular, this paper uses country 
ETFs that have significant trading volumes in the United States. 
While there are numerous studies on the effects of QE1 and QE2 on U.S fixed income 
market, e.g. Krishnamurthy & Vissing-Jorgensen (2011) and Gagnon et al (2011), there is a 
shortage of studies on the impact of how QE3 effects economies other than the United States. 
Eichengreen & Gupta (2014) is first in the literature to examine the effects of the 
anticipated withdrawal of the Federal Reserve’s third round of asset purchases on emerging 
markets. Since quantitative easing is an unconventional monetary policy that would eventually 
be phased out, the fear of this tapering to begin sooner than later rattled financial markets as it 
would mark the end of easy credit. When former Chairman Bernanke testified to the Congress on 
May 22, 2013 on the condition of the U.S. economy, the consensus concluded that Mr. Bernanke 
hinted at the possibility of tapering in his testimony, and markets responded adversely with large 
declines in financial asset prices.  Emerging market economies responded particularly to the 
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anticipated tapering since a significant portion of funds created by quantitative easing has flown 
to these regions. Tapering would substantially decrease the inflow of funds into these countries 
in a short period of time, with the possibility of creating a financial and/or currency crisis that 
would cripple these economies. 
Eichengreen & Gupta (2014) use cross sectional data of emerging markets to analyze 
which country was hit by the Fed’s tapering talks and for what reasons. The paper used exchange 
rates, foreign reserves and equity prices of emerging market countries in the period from April to 
August 2013, the time frame where the anxiety of tapering was the greatest. The authors 
concluded that there is little evidence that countries with stronger macroeconomic fundamentals 
experienced less severe negative impact in exchange rates, foreign reserves and stock prices. The 
hardest hit emerging market economies were the ones with larger and more liquid financial 
markets. Moreover, tapering news had larger effects on economies that allowed exchange rates 
to appreciate the most and current account deficit to widen in the period of quantitative easing.  
Prior to Eichengreen & Gupta (2014), there is an extensive literature that discusses how 
monetary policy implemented by advance economies can have global implications.  Wongswan 
(2005) examines the impact of U.S. monetary policy announcement surprises on equity indexes 
in sixteen countries, including both developed and emerging economies. By using high-
frequency intraday data, he finds a large and significant response of Asian, European, and Latin 
American equity indexes to U.S. monetary policy announcement surprises at short time horizons. 
Consistent with results for the U.S. equity market, Wongswan (2005) finds that foreign equity 
indexes react only to a surprise change in the current target rate in most cases. On average, an 
unanticipated 25-basis-point cut in the federal funds target rate is associated with a ½ to 2 ½ 
percent increase in foreign equity indexes. 
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Ammer, Vega, & Wongswan (2010) examine the global shocks that drive the cross-
country correlation of stock returns, and the transmission channels through which these shocks 
dissipate. The authors evaluate the implications of possible policy transmission channels for 
cross-sectional difference in the sensitivity of stock prices to U.S. monetary policy 
announcements by the FOMC, given the characteristics of the firms in their sample. They look 
for evidence that support the theory that monetary policy works through demand and credit 
channels, taking into consideration the possibility that cross-border effects may, partly, operate 
indirectly through foreign interest rates. 
The demand channel, sometimes referred to as “conventional” monetary policy 
transmission, affects firms through the direct impact of interest rates on demand for their goods 
and services. This can particularly impact the short run profitability to shareholders through 
either sales volumes or profit margins. The demand channel works because prices are sticky, and 
therefore, monetary policy actions affect short-term real interest rates. Thus, when the central 
bank changes target interest rate, the real interest rate affects aggregate demand, particularly for 
firms in cyclical sensitive industries and for firms that are relatively dependent on U.S. sales. 
Monetary policy works through the credit channel by affecting the supply of credit that is 
provided to businesses by financial intermediaries. As such, monetary policy decisions should 
have a larger effect on firms that are dependent on external financing. The credit channel affects 
foreign firms that depend on U.S. credit, or by foreign financial institutions that supply these 
foreign firms credit. Their findings show that foreign stocks in their data sample react on average 
roughly as much to FOMC announcements as do U.S. stocks. 
The study by Ammer, Vega, & Wongswan (2010) is different from previous similar 
studies in that the authors use foreign assets that trade contemporaneously with American stocks.  
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This is to better capture the surprise effect of the FOMC announcements.  Also, they study a 
wider range of firms (11,188 U.S. firms and 1,388 foreign firms) so as to allow for a better 
understanding of the impact of FOMC surprises differ for foreign firms, in cyclical industries, 
with more international customers, and firms that depend on external financing, and firms based 
in countries where interest rates are more closely linked to U.S. rates. The sample period 
includes all FOMC announcements from February 4, 2004 to December 12, 2006.  They find that 
foreign firms on average are as sensitive to U.S. monetary policy as U.S. firms, with cross-
sectional variation across firms.  In particular, foreign stocks in cyclically sensitive industries 
show stronger responses to interest rate surprises, and that transmission of U.S. policy appears to 
be stronger to economies with fixed exchange rates.   
Fratzscher, Lo Duca, & Straub (2013) analyze the global spillovers of the Federal 
Reserve’s unconventional monetary policy measures. They find that QE1 was highly effective in 
lowering sovereign yields and raising equity markets, especially in the U.S. relative to other 
countries. QE2 boosted equities worldwide, but had muted impact on yields across countries.  
Additionally, the impact of Fed operations, such as Treasury and MBS purchases, on portfolio 
allocations and asset prices dwarfed those of Fed announcements.    Therefore, the use of event-
study approach in analyzing the impacts of quantitative easing on asset prices can potentially 
shed more light on the impact of Fed’s unconventional monetary policy, more so than other types 
of studies. 
Aizenman, Binici, & Hutchison (2014) evaluate the impact of tapering “news” 
announcements by Fed senior policy makers on financial markets in emerging economies. They 
apply a panel framework using daily data, and find that emerging market asset prices respond 
most to statements by the former Fed Chairman Bernanke, and much less to other Fed officials. 
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A possible interpretation of their finding is that tapering news had less impact on countries that 
received fewer inflows of funds during the quantitative years and had less to lose in terms of 
repatriation of capital and reversal of carry-trade activities. 
Similar to these studies detailed in the literature review, my paper is an attempt to 
understand how exchange rates and stock markets in emerging markets react to news 
announcements. This paper is different in that it analyzes returns of assets that are trading 
contemporaneously with their U.S. counterparts, particularly the ones actively trading at the time 
of day of the announcement dates. This is an effort to solve potential problem in previous studies 
of the response of financial asset prices to monetary policy announcements, where the variables 
include asset prices in foreign financial markets that are in different time zones. In particular, this 
paper uses country ETFs that have significant trading volumes in the United States. 
While my paper is based on the panel framework of Aizenman, Binici, & Hutchison 
(2014), it encompasses both the purchasing and tapering segments of quantitative easing. In 
addition to Fed announcements, including both senior policymakers and the chairman, I also 
include other news announcements that are related to the anticipation of tapering, such as 
releases of important U.S. macroeconomic data that signals either more monetary easing or 
tapering. 
Questions to be answered in the paper are: 
(i) What are the impacts of the third round of quantitative easing on EMEs? 






2.3 Data and Methodology 
2.3.1  Data 
Following Aizenman, Binici, & Hutchison (2014), this paper utilizes a quasi-event study 
with panel data of twenty-two emerging market economies to measure the impact of QE3 news 
announcements on foreign exchange rates and ETF prices.  Table 2.1 lists the twenty-two 
countries in this study.  This paper is different than its predecessor in that it includes analysis on 
flow of funds and volatility issues associated with the Fed’s QE announcements.  
Table 2.1 – Emerging Market Sample 
Country 





5 Indonesia  






12 South Africa 











The time period for this study is from August 1, 2012 to May 30, 2014 (one month before 
QE3 announcement to one month after the fourth announcements of tapering by the Fed), using 
intraday asset returns during this period.  There are 471 days in the sample.  News 
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announcements considered in this study include the ones supporting further easing or tapering. 
These news announcements are divided into four groups: easing announcements or statements 
from FOMC and top Fed officials, such as the chairman, governors, and bank presidents (QEF); 
non-Fed news releases supporting further easing, such as weak U.S. economic data releases 
(QEN); tapering announcements or statements from FOMC and top Fed officials (TF); and non-
Fed news releases supporting tapering (TN), such as strong U.S. economic data releases.  See 
Table 2.2 in the appendix for the list of event dates. 
News searches are conducted on Bloomberg and Factiva, and these QE-related news 
items are verified to be the main news event on the dates included in this study. Additionally, 
daily data of control variables indicating flow of funds activities and volatility are included in 
this study; they are the currency spread between the spot rate and 3-month futures for each EME 
(FXSpread), iShares MSCI Emerging Markets ETF (EME-ETF), spread between 10-year 
treasury and Baa corporate bond yield (BondSpread), 3-month treasury bill rate (TBillRate), 
federal funds rate (FFRate), Chicago Board Options Exchange Market Volatility Index (VIX), 
and SPDR S&P 500, the ETF that tracks the performance of S&P 500 index (SPY).  While some 
of these variables are not directly related to emerging markets, but they are indicators of flow of 
funds between the United States and these emerging markets.  For instance, a bigger spread 
between the 10-year treasury and Baa corporate bond yield signals higher market risk.  
Therefore, some funds invested in emerging will flow back to safer investments in the United 
States.  All other data is obtained from Bloomberg or the Federal Reserve.  Table 2.3 is a 










FXit EME country currency daily return. 
 
ETFit EME individual country ETF daily return. 
 





QEFt Easing announcements or statements from FOMC and top Fed officials, 
such as the chairman, governors, and bank presidents. 
 
QENt Non-Fed news releases supporting further easing, such as weak U.S. 
economic data. 
 
TFt Tapering announcements or statements from FOMC and top Fed officials. 
 





Currency spread between the spot rate and 3-month futures for each EME. 
BONDSPREADt 
 
Spread between 10-year treasury and Baa corporate bond yield. 
TBILLRATEt 
 
3-month treasury bills rate. 
FFRATEt 
 












In this paper, country ETFs that mimic each country’s stock market index are used 
instead of equity indexes, as in Hasbrouck (2003) and Wang, Yang, & Wu (2006). The 
advantage of using equity ETFs instead of broad stock market indexes is that ETFs are regularly 
and continuously traded, while indexes are not directly tradable. Thus, ETFs are not restricted by 
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the nonsynchronous trading problem of indexes. Furthermore, the intraday impact on ETFs is 




This paper utilizes a quasi-event study approach using a panel of twenty countries to 
estimate the impact of quantitative easing-related news on asset prices in EMEs.  Two models 
are examined.  The first model estimated includes only the dummy variables for the event dates, 
similar to Aizenman, Binici, & Hutchison (2014). 
(1) 𝑃𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛿1𝑄𝐸𝐹𝑡 + 𝛿2𝑄𝐸𝑁𝑡 + 𝛿3𝑇𝐹𝑡 + 𝛿4𝑇𝑁𝑡 + 𝑎𝑖 + 𝑢𝑖𝑡 
where i = 1, 2, …, 22 EMEs, and t = each trading day from August 1, 2012 to May 30, 2014.  A 
fixed-effects estimation, as well as random effects, are employed to estimate equation (1).  Pit is 
either the individual country’s currency daily rate of return, or the country’s ETF daily return, or 
the ETF for the composite emerging market.  The results of both fixed and random effects 
estimations are compared in a Hausman test, which reveals that a random effects model is more 
appropriate for equation (1).  See Table 4 for regression results of this first estimation. 
The second model specification is to explain country currency rates and ETF prices for 
EMEs, similar to equation (1), albeit with more explanatory variables to reflect other factors 
involved, such as flow of funds and volatility data.  Thus, equation (2) includes all the 
announcement dates in equation (1), plus variables that are indicators of the risk aversion and 
flow of funds, and volatility issues.  The variables BONDSPREADt is the spread between 10-year 
treasury and Baa corporate bond yield; this is a risk aversion indicator, in that if the spread is 
small, then more funds would flow into EMEs, and if the spread is larger, then funds would be 
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withdraw from EMEs and flow back into the U.S. financial markets.  TBILLRATEt is the 3-
month T-bill rate, or the risk-free rate, is another risk aversion indicator.  FFRATEt is the daily 
federal funds rate; it is included in the equation as a gauge of the effectiveness of the Fed’s 
conventional monetary policy tool on EMEs.  VIXt is the Chicago Board Options Exchange 
Market Volatility Index, a popular measure of the implied volatility of S&P 500 index options.  
A higher VIX usually signals too much fear in the stock market, and funds would pull out of the 
overall financial market, U.S. and EMEs.  Lastly, SPYt is the exchange-traded fund (ETF) that 
tracks the performance of S&P 500 index, included in the equation as an indicator for fund 
outflow from EMEs into U.S. market. 
A random effects model is also more appropriate, as confirmed by a Hausman test.   
 
(2) 𝑃𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛿1𝑄𝐸𝐹𝑡 + 𝛿2𝑄𝐸𝑁𝑡 + 𝛿3𝑇𝐹𝑡 + 𝛿4𝑇𝑁𝑡 + 𝛽1𝐵𝑂𝑁𝐷𝑆𝑃𝑅𝐸𝐴𝐷𝑡 +
𝛽2𝑇𝐵𝐼𝐿𝐿𝑅𝐴𝑇𝐸𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐹𝐹𝑅𝐴𝑇𝐸𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑉𝐼𝑋𝑡 + 𝛽5𝑆𝑃𝑌𝑡 + 𝑎𝑖 + 𝑢𝑖𝑡 
 
 
2.3.3 Methodology with Openness Classification 
Another question of interest emerging out of my regression results is: Does the 
magnitude of impact of the Fed’s policy differ amongst these EMEs with different degrees of 
financial openness?  Since countries that are more open financially would seem to be the ones 
affected by the Fed’s policy more, as funds flow more freely into these countries when easing 
occurred, and withdraw more rapidly as tapering ensued. 
Two methods were considered for this part of the study.  The first is to introduce an 
interactive term into my equations with the new variable of financial openness indicator.  
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However, the most recent data for financial openness and similar macroeconomics indicators is 
for the year 2012, and my study is more current, from 2012 to 2014.  Thus, the second method is 
used, where I use the 2012 Chinn-Ito financial openness index (Chinn & Ito, 2008), and group 
the twenty-two EMEs into three groups: (1) not very open, (2) somewhat open, and (3) very 




Table 2.4 Financial Openness Groups 





China 2012 0.162911 Not very open 
India 2012 0.162911 Not very open 
Malaysia 2012 0.162911 Not very open 
Philippines 2012 0.162911 Not very open 
South Africa 2012 0.162911 Not very open 
Thailand 2012 0.162911 Not very open 
Brazil 2012 0.409077 Somewhat open 
Colombia 2012 0.409077 Somewhat open 
Indonesia 2012 0.409077 Somewhat open 
Vietnam 2012 0.409077 Somewhat open 
Poland 2012 0.448754 Somewhat open 
Turkey 2012 0.448754 Somewhat open 
Egypt, Arab Rep. 2012 0.50977 Somewhat open 
Russian Federation 2012 0.653141 Very open 
Chile 2012 0.694919 Very open 
Mexico 2012 0.694919 Very open 
Taiwan 2012 0.714158 Very open 
Korea, Rep. 2012 0.714158 Very open 
Peru 2012 1 Very open 
Czech Republic 2012 1 Very open 
Hungary 2012 1 Very open 




2.4 Empirical Results  
Empirical results for both estimated models are summarized in Tables 2.5 – 2.6.  Similar 
to Aizenman, Binici, & Hutchison (2014), regression outcomes indicate that equation (1) does 
not have much explanatory power with extremely low R-squared of less than 1 percent.  
Additionally, while a Hausman test revealed that the random effects estimation is more 
                                                          
12 Normalized so that zero being least opened, and one being most opened. 
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appropriate than the fixed effects model, but the results, including standard errors, are not that 
different.  Random effects estimation shows that official Fed announcements, including press 
releases of FOMC meetings and other statements from Fed officials regarding QE and tapering, 
are significant at the 1% level and with the coefficients having the expected signs.  Thus, QE 
announcements lead to appreciation of EME currencies, while tapering announcements lead to 
depreciations.  Additionally, QE announcements boost stock prices, while tapering 
announcements have negative effects.  Economic news releases that would lead to more QE or 
tapering are not significant at all. 
Results for equation (2) are more notable.  For the twenty-two countries included in this 
paper, the random effects estimation on the dependent variable country ETF daily return yields 
an R-squared of 16.67 percent, and the coefficients with significant results have the expected 
signs.  Moreover, ETF return during this period not only responded to Fed’s unconventional 
monetary policy announcements, but also positively to the conventional policy of targeting the 
fed funds rate with statistically significant result.  This outcome conforms to market consensus 
that the Fed’s monetary policy, whether conventional or unconventional, affects emerging 
economies financial markets.  The markets respond more to tapering announcements than easing 
announcements.  This is likely due to the markets are already used to the Fed’s easing policies, 
but fear tapering and the associated negative effects.  Thus, bad news from the Fed has a larger 




Table 2.5 Equation (1) Estimation Results 
A. Regressions 





























































Observations 10366 8735 10366 8735 474 
R-squared 0.0083 0.0085 0.0083 0.0084 0.0296 
Number of 
Countries 
22 19 22 19 NA 
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses.  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * P<0.1. 
 
B. Hausman Test for FXit 
 Fixed Effects (FE) 
Coefficients 
Random Effects (RE) 
Coefficients 
Difference 
FE - RE 
Standard Error 
QEFt -.1422863 -.1422271 -.0000591 .0006019 
QENt -.0444867 -.0444405 -.0000462 .0011377 
TFt .1918091 .1918525 -.0000434 .0005134 
TNt .0027281 .0027604 -.0000323 .0005319 
FE = consistent under Ho and Ha; obtained from xtreg 
RE= inconsistent under Ha, efficient under Ho; obtained from xtreg 
Test:  Ho:  difference in coefficients not systematic 
Prob>chi2 =      0.9999 
 
 
C. Hausman Test for ETFit 
 Fixed Effects (FE) 
Coefficients 
Random Effects (RE) 
Coefficients 
Difference 
FE - RE 
Standard Error 
QEFt .4523766 .4524743 -.0000977 .0021975 
QENt .0322443 .0323562 -.0001119 .004198 
TFt -.6614379 -.6613306 -.0001073 .001874 
TNt .2494926 .2495994 -.0001068 .0019652 
FE = consistent under Ho and Ha; obtained from xtreg 
RE= inconsistent under Ha, efficient under Ho; obtained from xtreg 
Test:  Ho:  difference in coefficients not systematic 




Table 2.6 Equation (2) Estimation Results 
A. Regression Results 



































































































Observations 10300 8732 10300 8732 
R-squared .0520 0.1667 .0520 .1667 
Number of 
Countries 
22 19 22 19 
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses.  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * P<0.1. 
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B. Hausman Test for FXit 
 Fixed Effects (FE) 
Coefficients 
Random Effects (RE) 
Coefficients 
Difference 
FE - RE 
Standard Error 
QEFt -0.103482 -0.103450 -0.000032 0.000570 
QENt -0.073732 -0.073691 -0.000041 0.001074 
TFt 0.149698 0.149735 -0.000037 0.000485 
TNt 0.031654 0.031690 -0.000036 0.000512 
BONDSPREADt 0.007000 0.007278 -0.000278 0.000538 
TBILLRATEt 0.467415 0.467518 -0.000103 0.005044 
FFRATEt -0.455604 -0.455899 0.000294 0.004536 
VIXt 0.002036 0.002034 0.000002 0.000025 
SPYt -0.136799 -0.136832 0.000033 0.000235 
FE = consistent under Ho and Ha; obtained from xtreg 
RE= inconsistent under Ha, efficient under Ho; obtained from xtreg 
Test:  Ho:  difference in coefficients not systematic 




C.  Hausman Test for ETFit 
 Fixed Effects (FE) 
Coefficients 
Random Effects (RE) 
Coefficients 
Difference 
FE - RE 
Standard Error 
QEFt 0.217917 0.218016 -0.000099 0.001011 
QENt 0.230676 0.230795 -0.000119 0.001926 
TFt -0.372028 -0.371923 -0.000105 0.000863 
TNt 0.059656 0.059761 -0.000105 0.000920 
BONDSPREADt -0.116903 -0.117192 0.000288 0.000939 
TBILLRATEt -1.760078 -1.762556 0.002478 0.009248 
FFRATEt 2.228788 2.231718 -0.002930 0.008229 
VIXt -0.010353 -0.010348 -0.000005 0.000044 
SPYt 0.957287 0.957363 -0.000077 0.000418 
FE = consistent under Ho and Ha; obtained from xtreg 
RE= inconsistent under Ha, efficient under Ho; obtained from xtreg 
Test:  Ho:  difference in coefficients not systematic 




Lastly, the regressions with the countries grouped into three financial openness 
categories, the results all have the expected signs as the previous regressions, with QE having 
positive effect on currencies and stock markets and tapering having negative effects.  This is as 
expected since countries that are not as open impose greater restrictions on their currencies, thus 
reducing volatility.  Countries that are more open (Group 3) experienced greater currency 




Table 2.7 Regression Results Based on Openness Groups 
I.     Not-Very-Open EMEs 

























Observations 2798 2295 
R-squared 0.0054 0.0176 
Number of Countries 6  
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses.  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * P<0.1. 























































Observations 2780 2295 
R-squared .031 .3309 
Number of Countries 6 5 







II.     Somewhat-Open EMEs 

























Observations 3307 2295 
R-squared 0.0066 0.0098 
Number of Countries 7 7 
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses.  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * P<0.1. 























































Observations 3286 3224 
R-squared .0401 .2098 
Number of Countries 7 7 





III.     Very-Open EMEs 

























Observations 4261 3213 
R-squared 0.0147 0.0061 
Number of Countries 9 7 
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses.  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * P<0.1. 























































Observations 4234 3213 
R-squared .0866 .1056 
Number of Countries 9 7 





In terms of the stock market, the reactions of ETFs to QE and tapering announcements 
are mixed.  Countries that are less open reacted more to tapering news, while countries that are 
more open have greater reactions to QE news.  A likely explanation is that the funds that the Fed 
interjected into the economy via QE flowed more to countries with greater financial openness.  
On the other hand, tapering induced fear, particularly in countries with less financial openness, 
leading to more funds flowing out of their stock markets.  This is a potential topic for further 
research in the future, especially after tapering has ended. 
 
2.5 Concluding Remarks 
Economists have often asserted that the Federal Reserve’s unconventional policy of 
quantitative easing and tapering have an usually significant effect on emerging economies’ 
financial markets, since the Fed’s large-scale asset purchases and withdrawals caused large 
capital inflows and outflows, and carry-trade activities to fluctuate greatly.  Tapering is claimed 
to be especially damaging to EME’s currency rates and stock markets. 
This paper confirms these conjectures with statistically significant results.  Also, I find 
that bad news regarding quantitative easing have a larger effect than good news.  This 
incongruence could be due to financial markets being accustomed to further easing, with 
numerous literatures showing the effects of quantitative easing becoming less effective since the 
announcement of the first round of such action beginning in December 2008 (Gagnon et al 
2011).  Market speculation of tapering induced fear and volatility, and regression results are 
particularly poignant for equity markets in these emerging economies. 
Going forward, a recommended action for these economies in placating volatility and 
sudden outflow of capital caused by speculation of U.S. monetary policies is for central banks in 
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these countries to take a more active role in countering the Fed’s actions with their own 
monetary policies.  These policy decisions can be reinforce with more transparent 
communications to market participants and can reduce havoc in these countries’ financial 
systems.  Ehrmann & Fratscher (2009) find that ECB press conferences provide substantial 
additional information to financial markets beyond policy decisions, and press conference have 






Table 2.2. List of Event Dates (August 1, 2012 – May 30, 2014) 
Table 2.2.A QE3 Official Announcements from FOMC or Statements of Top Fed Officials 
(𝑄𝐸𝐹𝑡) 
Date Event Source News Event 
September 13, 2012 FOMC Press Release The Fed announced the beginning of QE3 with 
monthly asset purchase of $85 billion. 
October 24, 2012 FOMC Press Release The Fed announced continuing of QE3 with 
monthly asset purchase of $85 billion. 
December 12, 2012 FOMC Press Release The Fed announced continuing of QE3 with 
month asset purchase of $85 billion. 
January 30, 2013 FOMC Press Release The Fed announced continuing of QE3 with 
monthly asset purchase of $85 billion. 
March 20, 2013 FOMC Press Release The Fed announced continuing of QE3 with 
monthly asset purchase of $85 billion. 
May 1, 2013 FOMC Press Release The Fed announced continuing of QE3 with 
month asset purchase of $85 billion. 
June 7, 2013 
 
St. Louis Fed 
President James 
Bullard 
St. Louis President expressed to media that he 
is reluctant to start tapering. 
June 19, 2013 FOMC Press Release The Fed announced continuing of QE3 with 
monthly asset purchase of $85 billion. 
July 10, 2013 FOMC Press Release Minutes of the FOMC, June 18-19, 2013. 
July 17, 2013 Testimony by Ben 
Bernanke 
Semiannual Monetary Policy Report to the 
Congress.   Before the Committee on Financial 
Services, U.S. House of Representatives, 
Washington, D.C. 
July 31, 2013 FOMC Press Release The Fed announced continuing of QE3 with 
monthly asset purchase of $85 billion. 
September 18, 2013 FOMC Press Release The Fed announced continuing of QE3 with 
monthly asset purchase of $85 billion. 
October 10, 2013 St. Louis Fed 
President James 
Bullard 
38th Annual Federal Reserve Bank of St. 
Louis Fall Conference. 
October 30, 2013 FOMC Press Release The Fed announced continuing of QE3 with 
monthly asset purchase of $85 billion. 






Table 2.2.B Non-Fed news releases supporting further easing (𝑄𝐸𝑁𝑡) 
Date Event Source News Event 
August 26, 2013 Economic Data 
Release 
Weaker-than-expected July durable goods 
orders. 
October 3, 2013 Economic Data 
Release 
Weaker than expected private payrolls data. 
October 22, 2013 Economic Data 
Release 
Weak September jobs data released. 
October 25, 2013 Economic Data 
Release 




Table 2.2.C Official Announcements from FOMC or Statements of Top Fed Officials on 
Tapering (𝑇𝐹𝑡) 
Date Event Source News Event 
February 1, 2013 
 
St. Louis Fed President 
James Bullard Statement 
Mr. Bullard backs cut to QE if growth picks 
up. 
February 20, 2013 
 
FOMC Press Release Minutes of the FOMC, January 29-30, 2013. 
March 25, 2013 Ben Bernanke Speech at 
FOMC Meeting 
Fed hints at scaling down QE. 
April 3, 2013 Statement from Atlanta 
Bank President Dennis 
Lockhart 
The Federal Reserve's bond purchase, or 
quantitative easing, program could be scaled 
back later this year or early next year, said 
Atlanta Fed Pres. Dennis Lockhart. 
May 13, 2013 Statement from 
Philadelphia Federal 
Reserve Bank President 
Charles Plosser 
Fed's Plosser: Wants Fed to Slow QE Buys as 
Soon as June FOMC Meeting. 
May 17, 2013 Statement from Federal 
Reserve Bank of San 
Francisco President, John 
Williams 
Said the Fed is likely to reduce its $85 billion 
monthly bond buying program this summer 
and it may even exit QE3 altogether at the end 
of the year. 
May 22, 2013 Chairman Ben S. 
Bernanke Testimony 




Bernanke testimony signaling tapering for the 
first time. 
June 20, 2013 FOMC Press Release QE tapering likely to start this year, says 
Bernanke in FOMC Meeting. 
July 10, 2013 FOMC Press Release Around half of Fed policymakers wanted to 
bring its massive fiscal stimulus package to a 
relatively rapid halt this year, instead of 
phasing it out slowly by the middle of 2014, 
according to the minutes of its June meeting, 
published on Wednesday. 
August 7, 2013 Statements from Top Fed 
Officials 
Chicago Fed Pres. Charles Evans, who is on 
the policy panel, wouldn't rule out scaling back 
bond purchases starting with next month's 
meeting. Atlanta Fed Pres. Dennis Lockhart, 
who isn't a policymaker, said tapering of 
quantitative easing could start any time this 
year and as soon as Sept. Cleveland Fed chief 
Sandra Pianalto said if the job market stays 
strong, tapering may be appropriate.. 
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August 14, 2013 Statement from Atlanta 
President Dennis 
Lockhart 
Fed Reserve Bank of Atlanta President Dennis 
Lockhart signaled that policymakers may start 
reducing the USD 85 billion monthly bond 
buying program at any of the Fed's meetings 
scheduled over the next four months. 
August 21, 2013 FOMC Press Release Minutes of the FOMC, July 30-31, 2013. 
September 20, 
2013 
Remark from St. Louis 
President James Bullard 
Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis President 
James Bullard's remarks indicated the 
possibility of a small cut in stimulus next 
month. 
October 4, 2013 Richmond Federal 
Reserve Bank President 
Jeffrey Lacker Giving a 
Speech at a Conference 
for Financial Educators 
Richmond Federal Reserve Bank President 
Jeffrey Lacker said it is not certain the absence 
of major economic data due to the shuttered 
federal government will delay the central 
bank's decision regarding when to begin 
scaling back its $85 billion a month in bond 
purchases. 
October 9, 2013 Remark from Philadelphia 
Fed President Plosser 
Philadelphia Fed President Plosser said the 
central bank's bond-buying program was no 
longer effective, and that tapering should have 
begun at the Sept. policy meeting 
November 20, 
2013 
FOMC Press Release Minutes of the Federal Open Market 




Remark from Kansas City 
Fed President Esther 
George 
Kansas City Fed President Esther George said 
that she expects the US Federal Reserve to 
discuss the reduction of the central bank's 
record QE program at its upcoming meet next 
month. 
December 5, 2013 Remarks prepared for the 
Broward Workshop in Ft. 
Lauderdale, FL 
Atlanta Federal Reserve Bank President 
Dennis Lockhart Thursday said he believes it 
is now appropriate for monetary policymakers 
to begin considering dialing back the Fed's 




FOMC Press Release The Fed announced the beginning of tapering 
with monthly asset purchase reduced to $75 
billion. 
January 29, 2014 FOMC Press Release The Fed announced further tapering with 
monthly asset purchase reduced to $65 billion. 
March 19, 2014 FOMC Press Release The Fed announced further tapering with 
monthly asset purchase reduced to $55 billion. 
April 30, 2014 FOMC Press Release The Fed announced further tapering with 




Table 2.2.D Non-Fed news releases signaling tapering (𝑇𝑁𝑡) 
Date Event Source News Event 
June 7, 2013 Economic Data 
Release from Bureau 
of Labor Statistics 
Employment Situation for May 2013. 
June 25, 2013 Economic Data 
Release from Bureau 
of Economic 
Analysis 
Positive durable goods data. 
June 28, 2013 Economic Data 
Release 
Fall in jobless claims 
July 5, 2013 Economic Data 
Release 
Payroll growth near 200,000. 
August 15, 2013 Bureau of Labor 
Statistics 
CPI report is a sign that disinflationary 
pressures have bottomed out, supporting 
tapering. 
August 16, 2013 Economic Data 
Release 
Joblessness fell to a six year low last week. 
August 22, 2013 Economic Data 
Release 
Manufacturing activity in the US expanded at 
the fastest pace in five months in August 2013, 
a sign that the world's biggest economy has 
picked up a gear amid robust demand, boosting 
the case for the US Federal Reserve to start 
tapering QE over the next few months. 
August 29, 2013 Bureau of Labor 
Statistics and Bureau 
of Economic 
Analysis 
The U.S. economy grew at a 2.5 percent 
annual rate from April through June, much 
faster than previously estimated, the 
government said. Also, the Labor Department 
said the number of people who filed for 
unemployment benefits last week fell to 
331,000, the fewest in five years. 




September 6, 2013 
Labor Department New jobless claims last week fell to 323,000, 
the Labor Department said ahead of Friday's 
jobs report. The four-week average hit its 
lowest level since the economic recovery 
began in 2009.  
 
The Institute for Supply Management's 
nonmanufacturing index unexpectedly rose 2.6 
points in August to 58.6, its highest level since 
the end of 2005. The jobs, new orders and 
other gauges also showed accelerating growth.  
 
Along with upbeat reports on manufacturing, 
auto sales and more, economists believe it's a 
virtual lock that policymakers will begin to 
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curb the Fed's $85 billion-a-month bond 
buying program at their Sept. 17-18 meeting. 
September 13, 2013 Labor Department Joblessness claims fall. 
September 16, 2013 Census Bureau Positive retail sales figure. 
September 27, 2013 BEA Jobs data and GDP. 
November 6, 2013 BEA Better than expected U.S. service data. 
November 8, 2013 Labor Department Faster than expected US payrolls growth last 
month. 
November 27, 2013 Conference Board Positive U.S. housing data. 
December 4, 2013 ADP Positive ADP employment report.  
December 6, 2013 BLS Positive nonfarm payroll and GDP figure. 
December 17, 2013 National Association 
of Home Builders 
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